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I. INTRODUCTION 
The British House of Lords recently considered whether 
Augusto Pinochet was subject to arrest and possible extradition to 
Spain for alleged acts of torture and other egregious conduct 
carried out during his reign as Chile's head of state.1 The Law 
Lords held that a large majority of the charges against Pinochet 
were not proper grounds for extradition under British law. They 
also held, however, that Pinochet could potentially be extradited 
for alleged acts of torture committed after Britain's 1988 ratifica· 
tion of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.2 In reaching this latter 
conclusion, a majority of the Law Lords rejected Pinochet's claim 
that he was entitled to immunity from arrest on the torture charges 
because of his status as a former head of state. 
The Pinochet decision implicates a number of difficult issues at 
the heart of modem international law. It illustrates the growing 
tension between the international law principle of sovereign equal· 
ity and the quest for universal justice. It raises the question of 
whether international criminal law should be enforced unilaterally 
by national courts or through multilateral international tribunals. 
And it highlights the more fundamental issue of whether any inter· 
national criminal process is appropriate when a nation, like Chile, 
has addressed the human rights abuses of a prior regime through a 
domestic political compromise that facilitated a transition to 
democracy. 
Although ·these international law issues are relevant to this 
article, they are not its focus. The article focuses instead on a re· 
lated issue also implicated in Pinochet: international law's increas· 
ing interaction with and influence on domestic law and processes. 
In particular, we consider what, if anything, can be learned from 
Pinochet regarding the relationship between international law and 
U.S. domestic law. The specific circumstances of the Pinochet case 
- criminal extradition proceedings against a former head of state 
1. See Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.) 
[hereinafter Second Law Lords' Decision].  Judicial appeals to the House of Lords are heard 
by the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, or "Law Lords." Most appeals are heard by five Law 
Lords, but cases considered especially important are sometimes heard by seven. The Law 
Lords act as the final court of appeal for all civil cases in Great Britain and for all criminal 
cases in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. See FIONA CoWNIE & ANTHONY BRADNEY, 
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 41-45 {1996); GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, PRIN· 
CIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 61-62 (1997). 
2. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
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- will not arise often in the United States. For the past two 
decades, however, U.S. courts have been grappling with issues simi­
lar to those presented in Pinochet in numerous civil suits alleging 
violations of international human rights law by foreign officials. 
The parties and judges in the Pinochet case extensively considered 
this U.S. case law in analyzing whether Pinochet was entitled to im­
munity. In this article, we in effect do the opposite: we assess how 
the Pinochet decision and its international law holdings might be 
relevant to U.S. civil litigation. 
Plaintiffs and commentators are likely to claim that the Law 
Lords' analysis in Pinochet - especially their reliance on inter­
national human rights law to limit Pinochet's immunity - supports 
application of international human rights law by U.S. courts in civil 
litigation. The bulk of this article is devoted to showing why this is 
not so. Because of structural differences between the criminal and 
civil contexts, as well as differences between the British and U.S. 
approaches to the incorporation of international law, we conclude 
that Pinochet provides little support for civil human rights litigation 
against foreign officials in U.S. courts. We also argue that, because 
of the vagueness of international human rights law and the adverse 
foreign relations implications of civil suits against foreign officials, 
human rights litigation in U.S. courts should remain both limited in 
scope and under the control of the federal political branches. Not 
only is there nothing in the Pinochet decision to the contrary, but in 
several ways it bolsters our conclusions. 
We begin in Part II by describing the background and proceed­
ings of the Pinochet case, the House of Lords' analysis, and the in­
ternational law uncertainties highlighted by the Law Lords' 
decision. In Part III, we consider whether developments in inter­
national human rights law should limit the scope of the domestic 
immunity available to foreign governments and officials. The Law 
Lords held that these developments did limit the scope of 
Pinochet's immunity from criminal process in Great Britain. In the 
United States, however, the political branches and the federal 
courts have, with narrow and specific exceptions, declined to permit 
developments in international human rights law to limit the scope 
of foreign sovereign immunity from civil process. We argue that the 
adverse political consequences that might fl.ow from otherwise un­
fettered private lawsuits against foreign officials for human rights 
abuses justify the broader immunities available in U.S. domestic 
courts. 
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In Part IV, we consider the legitimacy of the U.S. counterpart to 
the British rule, invoked by some of the Law Lords in Pinochet, that 
customary international law (CIL) is part of the British common 
law. In' the United States, plaintiffs and scholars have argued for a 
similar rule of incorporation to justify the domestic application of 
substantive international human rights law. As we explain, how­
ever, the constitutional implications of an automatically incorpo­
rated CIL are more problematic for the United States than they are 
for Great Britain. As a result, when faced with claims of interna­
tional immunity, such as the claim of head-of-state immunity that 
was at issue in Pinochet, U.S. courts do not apply the CIL governing 
this immunity directly. Instead, they seek and follow political­
branch direction. The failure by courts to apply CIL as automati­
cally incorporated common law in this context, involving traditional 
rules of CIL that are a central component of international relations, 
casts substantial doubt on the claim that international human rights 
law should be applied as self-executing federal common law. 
In Part V, we defend the United States' general resistance to the 
domestic application of international human rights law. This resist­
ance has two dimensions. First, the United States does not apply 
international human rights law to domestic officials. This approach 
is justified by the profound uncertainty regarding the source and 
content of international law and by the general adequacy of U.S. 
domestic human rights protections. Second, the United States per­
mits the domestic application of international human rights law 
against foreign governmental officials only in very narrow contexts. 
This limited embrace of international human rights law reflects a 
legitimate concern with giving private citizens, and unelected 
judges, too much influence over U.S. foreign relations. As we ex­
plain, both of these justifications for resistance to the domestic ap­
plication of international human rights law - the vagueness of 
international norms and the danger that private lawsuits will inter­
fere with foreign relations - find support in the House of Lords' 
decision in Pinochet. 
II. THE PINOCHET CASE 
In this Part, we analyze the Pinochet case. We begin by explain­
ing the background of the case and the complex proceedings lead­
ing up to the House of Lords' decision. We then discuss some of 
the many legal uncertainties highlighted by the decision. 
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A. Background and Proceedings3 
Pinochet's Reign and Status. In 1973, Pinochet, then the com­
mander in chief of the army in Chile, led a military coup that over­
turned the elected government of President Salvador Allende. A 
military junta subsequently appointed Pinochet president of Chile, 
and he ruled the country for the next seventeen years. During his 
rule, hundreds of thousands of people were detained for political 
reasons, and several thousand disappeared or were killed. Pinochet 
stepped down as president in 1990, but he remained head of the 
army until March 1998, when he was appointed "Senator for Life." 
Pinochet's Arrest. On September 22, 1998, at the age of 82, 
Pinochet entered the United Kingdom for back surgery. On Octo­
ber 16, British authorities arrested him while he was recovering 
from the surgery in a London hospital. They based the arrest on a 
provisional warrant issued by a British magistrate, which was in 
turn based on an international arrest warrant issued by a judge in 
Spain.4 The international warrant alleged that Pinochet was re­
sponsible for murdering Spanish citizens in Chile between 1973 and 
1983 and that Spain intended to seek his extradition. On October 
22, a British magistrate issued a second provisional warrant based 
on a new international warrant from the Spanish judge alleging that 
Pinochet was responsible for acts of torture, hostage taking, and 
other conduct committed primarily, although not exclusively, 
against Chilean citizens in Chile. To understand the legal context of 
these warrants and the subsequent proceedings, it is necessary to 
consider briefly the international law concept of "universal juris­
diction," as well as British law concerning extradition and 
immunity. 
Universal Jurisdiction. International law normally requires that 
a nation that regulates conduct outside its territory have some con­
nection with the conduct or the person engaged in the conduct. In­
ternational law also recognizes, however, the concept of "universal 
jurisdiction," pursuant to which certain categories of conduct can be 
regulated by any nation.5 The theory is that those who engage in 
this conduct are hostis humani generis, or "enemies of all mankind," 
3. Unless otherwise specified, the facts in this section are drawn from the various 
opinions in the case. 
4. For a description of how the proceedings against Pinochet were initiated in Spain, see 
Richard J. Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet in Spain, 6 HUM. Rrs. Br. 3 (1999). 
5. See generally REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 404 (1987); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International 
Law, 66 TEXAS L. REv. 785 (1988) [hereinafter Universal Jurisdiction]. 
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and that all nations therefore have an interest in punishing them.6 
In the nineteenth century, nations invoked this concept to justify 
regulation of piracy on the high seas and, in some instances, the 
slave trade.7 After World War II, national courts and international 
war tribunals asserted universal jurisdiction over war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. 8 Modern treaties appear to authorize uni­
versal jurisdiction over certain additional crimes, such as torture, 
hostage taking, and hijacking.9 
The universal jurisdiction concept was relevant to the Pinochet 
case in several ways. First, Spain invoked this concept as a basis for 
regulating, and requesting extradition for, Pinochet's alleged con­
duct. The torture, hostage taking, and other acts allegedly commit­
ted by Pinochet took place primarily in Chile. Moreover, most of 
the victims were not Spanish citizens, and Pinochet was not himself 
a Spanish citizen. Nevertheless, the universal jurisdiction concept 
allowed Spain to claim authority under international law to regulate 
Pinochet's conduct. Second, this concept played an important role 
in the House of Lords' application of British extradition law. His­
torically, torture was not an extraterritorial crime in Britain. In 
1988, however, Britain enacted a criminal statute authorizing uni­
versal jurisdiction over official acts of torture committed anywhere 
in the world.10 As explained below, the House of Lords ultimately 
found that acts of torture committed by Pinochet before the enact­
ment of this statute were not a proper basis for extradition. Finally, 
some of the Law Lords invoked the universal jurisdiction concept 
as a justification for limiting Pinochet's head-of-state immunity. 
6. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. 
L. RE.v. 349, 416-17 (1988) [hereinafter Federal Questions]; see also Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876, 890 {2d Cir. 1980) ("[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become -
like the pirate and slave trader before hinI - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind."). 
7. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International 
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Ftlartiga v. Pena-lrala, 22 HARV, 
lNrL. L.J. 53, 60-62 {1981). But cf Al.FRED P. RUBIN, ETHICS AND AUTIIORITY IN INTERNA· 
TIONAL LAW 84-110 (1997) (arguing that the nineteenth century piracy and slave trade cases 
all involved connections to the regulating state). 
8. See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 805-10. The universal jurisdiction 
concept was invoked by Israel, for example, as a basis for trying Adolf Eichmann after it 
abducted hinI from Argentina. See Cr.A. 333/61, Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 16 P.D. 
2033, 2047, 2060-67, 36 l.L.R. 5, 287, 298-304 (S. Ct. 1962) (Isr.). 
9. See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 816-19. 
10. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33, § 134, reprinted in 12 HALSBURY's STATUTES 
OF ENGLAND AND WALES 1079 (4th ed. 1997). 
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Britain's Extradition Statute. Extradition in Great Britain is gov­
erned by its 1989 Extradition Act.11 This Act provides that a per­
son who is in Great Britain and is accused in a foreign state of an 
"extradition crime" may be "arrested and returned" to that state if 
the state has an extradition treaty with Great Britain.12 The Act 
defines an extradition crime as either an offense committed within 
the territory of the foreign state or an extraterritorial offense 
against the law of the foreign state.13 For extraterritorial offenses, 
however, either the foreign state must base its jurisdiction on the 
nationality of the offender, or the crime charged must be such that 
"in corresponding circumstances equivalent conduct would consti­
tute an extra-territorial offence against the law of the United 
Kingdom."14 In extradition parlance, this is a form of "double 
criminality" requirement.15 The Act also makes clear that extradi­
tion proceedings cannot be carried out without the approval of 
Britain's Home Secretary.16 The Act does allow, however, for an 
initial arrest and preliminary proceedings based, as in the Pinochet 
case, on the issuance of a "provisional warrant."17 
Britain's Immunity Law. Great Britain has a statute regulating 
foreign governmental immunity in its courts.18 This statute specifi­
cally includes heads of state in its list of entities entitled to sover­
eign immunity . in civil litigation.19 Of more relevance to the 
Pinochet case, the statute also provides that, "subject to . .. any 
necessary modifications," heads of state shall be entitled to the im­
munities accorded to diplomats.20 Britain's diplomatic immunity 
statute, in tum, accords diplomats absolute criminal immunity while 
11. See Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33, reprinted in 17 liALsBURY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND 
AND WALES 558 (4th ed. 1993). 
12. Extradition Act § 1(1). The pertinent international extradition agreement between 
the United Kingdom and Spain is the European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, 
U.K.-Spain, 359 U.N.T.S. 273. 
13. See Extradition Act§ 2(1). 
14. Extradition Act § 2(2). 
15. For an introduction to the concept of double criminality, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADmoN: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 388-93 (3d ed. 1996). 
16. See Extradition Act § 7(1). The Act refers generally to the "Secretary of State." 
There are a number of secretaries of state in Great Britain, each with different responsibili­
ties. Responsibilities relating to extradition have been assigned to the Home Secretary. See 
HILAIRE BARNET!', CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 786-87 (2d ed. 1998). 
17. See Extradition Act§ 8(1)(b). A provisional warrant may be issued prior to the re­
ceipt of an authorization by the Home Secretary to proceed with extradition. See § 8(1)(b). 
The Home Secretary has the power to cancel such a warrant, and he must do so if he decides 
not to issue an authorization to proceed. See § 8(4). 
18. See State !=unity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (Eng.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123. 
19. See State !=unity Act § 14(1)(a). 
20. See State !=unity Act § 20(1). 
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they are serving as part of a diplomatic mission.21 This form of im­
munity, known as immunity "ratione personae, " is a status immunity 
that attaches to diplomats - and, by reference, to heads of state -
as the personal embodiment of the foreign state during their time in 
service. After their service ceases, diplomats - and, by reference, 
heads of state - are then entitled to criminal immunity for the acts 
they performed while carrying out their official functions.22 This 
form of immunity, known as immunity "ratione materiae, " is a sub­
ject matter immunity that prevents the official acts of one state from 
being called into question in the courts of another.23 
Divisional Court Decision. Pinochet challenged his arrest in 
court and, on October 28, a three-judge panel of the Divisional 
Court of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice 
held both provisional arrest warrants invalid.24 The court held that 
the first warrant failed to comply with the double criminality re­
quirement because British law would not allow for jurisdiction over 
the murder of a British citizen committed abroad. The court fur­
ther held that both warrants were invalid because, as a former head 
of state, Pinochet was entitled to immunity from arrest. The court 
acknowledged that Pinochet's alleged acts were criminal under in­
ternational law but noted that "[a] former head of state is clearly 
entitled to immunity in relation to criminal acts performed in the 
course of exercising public functions. "25 Britain's Crown Prosecu­
tion Service appealed the decision on behalf of Spain, and several 
human rights groups, including Amnesty International, intervened 
in the appeal. In the meantime, Spain issued a formal extradition 
request that substantially expanded the number and description of 
crimes allegedly committed by Pinochet, adding, among other 
things, a charge of genocide. 
First Law Lords' Decision. On November 25, a five-member 
panel of the House of Lords overturned the Divisional Court's rul­
ing.26 As is customary, the decision took the form of seriatim opin­
ions. The Law Lords held, by a 3-2 majority, that Pinochet was not 
21. See Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964, ch. 81, sched. l, art. 29, reprinted in 
10 HA!.sBURY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 676, 682 (4th ed. 1995). 
22. See Diplomatic Privileges Act § 39. 
23. For a general discussion of the distinction between immunity ratione personae and 
immunity ratione materiae, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
330-31 (4th ed. 1990). 
24. See In re an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum re: Augusto 
Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B. Div!. Ct. 1998) [hereinafter Divisional Court Decision]. 
25. Divisional Court Decision, 38 I.L.M. at 83 (Lord Bingham). 
26. See Regina v. Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet, [1998) 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.) [hereinafter First 
Law Lords' Decision]. 
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entitled to immunity for the acts alleged in the second arrest war­
rant. They reasoned that the immunity of former heads of state 
does not apply to acts of torture and hostage taking because such 
acts do not constitute official functions of a head of state under in­
ternational law.27 As one member of the majority explained, 
international law has made plain that certain types of conduct, includ­
ing torture and hostage-taking, are not acceptable conduct on the part 
of anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or even more so, as 
it does to everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make a mock­
ery of international law.28 
The dissenters argued, by contrast, that head-of-state immunity ap­
plies to illegal acts and has not been abrogated by relevant treaties 
or custom.29 
In early December, Britain's Home Secretary authorized the ex­
tradition proceedings to go forward, except with respect to the 
charge of genocide.30 Shortly thereafter, Pinochet's lawyers 
petitioned the House of Lords to vacate the panel decision.because 
one member of the majority had failed to disclose that he was an 
unpaid director of a fund-raising arm of Amnesty International. 
On December 17, the House of Lords, in an unprecedented step, 
granted the request and vacated the decision.31 
Second Law Lords' Decision. A seven-member panel of the 
House of Lords reheard the appeal in January and early February 
1999. The government of Chile intervened in these proceedings 
and argued for Pinochet's release. During the proceedings, 
Britain's Crown Prosecutor submitted a schedule stating that · 
Spain's allegations against Pinochet - with the exception of the 
genocide charge - would constitute thirty-two violations of British 
criminal law. On March 24, 1999, after seven weeks of deliberation, 
the House of Lords issued its second decision. 
The second decision differed significantly from the first. It did 
not reach the head-of-state immunity issue until after it had first 
dismissed, on the basis of double criminality, a large majority of the 
extradition charges against Pinochet. As noted above, the British 
27. See First Law Lords' Decision, [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1499-1502 (Lord Nicholls), 1506 
(Lord Steyn), 1508 (Lord Hoffman). 
28. [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1500 (Lord Nicholls). 
29. See [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1476-78 (Lord Slynn), 1492-93 (Lord Lloyd). 
30. See 38 I.L.M. 489 (1999) (statement of Jack Straw, Home Secretary). The Home Sec­
retary did not authorize extradition proceedings on the genocide charge because he con­
cluded that the double criminality requirement was not satisfied with respect to that charge. 
See id. 
31. See In re Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L.) (oral judgment delivered on December 
17, 1998, written reasons on January 15, 1999). 
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extradition statute allows extradition for extraterritorial offenses if 
"in corresponding circumstances equivalent conduct would consti­
tute an extraterritorial offense against the law of the United 
Kingdom. "32 The Divisional Court had concluded with little analy­
sis that this requirement meant simply that the conduct must be a 
crime under British law at the time of the extradition request. 33 The 
first House of Lords' decision appeared to reach the same conclu­
sion on this point, again with little analysis.34 In the second deci­
sion, by contrast, the Law Lords considered the issue in detail.35 
They held unanimously that the extradition statute requires the ex­
traterritorial conduct to have been a crime under British law at the 
time the conduct took place. Most of the charges against Pinochet, 
including most of the charges regarding torture, concerned conduct 
prior to September 29, 1988, the date when Great Britain made tor­
ture an extraterritorial crime. Six of the seven Law Lords con­
cluded that these charges therefore could not serve as a basis for 
extradition. 36 
After reaching this conclusion regarding double criminality, and 
after dismissing the hostage-taking charge on the merits,37 the Law 
Lords were left with charges relating to torture and conspiracy to 
commit torture after September 29, 1988, and with charges of con­
spiracy in Spain to co:rllmit murder and torture in Spain. It was with 
respect to these charges that the Law Lords considered the issue of 
immunity. Six of the Law Lords agreed that Pinochet was generally 
32. Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33, § 2(2), reprinted in 17 HALSBURY's STATUTES OF 
ENGLAND AND WALES 558, 561 (4th ed. 1993). 
33. See Divisional Court Decision, 38 I.L.M. 68, 79 (Q.B. Div!. Ct. 1998) (Lord Bingham) 
("[T]he conduct alleged against the subject of the request need not in my judgment have 
been criminal here at the time the alleged crime was committed abroad."). The Home 
Secretary relied on this holding in his statement authorizing extradition proceedings to go 
forward. 
34. See First Law Lords' Decision, [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1481 (Lord Lloyd) (noting that he 
"agree[d] with the Divisional Court that [the argument that the conduct must have been 
criminal in Great Britain when it occurred] is bad"). 
35. Apparently, Pinochet's lawyers revived this argument during the second House of 
Lords' hearing in response to the Crown Prosecution Service's attempt to extend the charges 
against Pinochet to include conduct allegedly committed before Pinochet was head of state. 
See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827, 833 (H.L.) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
36. Lord Millett dissented on this point, reasoning that extraterritorial torture was a com­
mon law crime in Britain before the Convention came into force, and thus satisfied the 
double criminality requirement. See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 912 
(Lord Millett). The Law Lords also dismissed the non-torture charges on double criminality 
grounds; the complex reasons for the dismissal are set forth in Lord Hope's opinion. See 
[1999] 2 W.L.R. at 870-71 (Lord Hope). 
37. The Law Lords concluded that the charges against Pinochet relating to hostage taking 
failed to state a claim under Britain's 1982 Hostage Taking Act because there was no allega­
tion that the hostage taking was designed to compel action or inaction by third parties. See 
[1999] 2 W.L.R. at 840 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 850 (Lord Goff), 871 (Lord Hope). 
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entitled to immunity under both British statutory law and inter­
national law for criminal conduct committed while carrying out his 
functions as head of state.38 Six of the Law Lords also concluded, 
however, that this former-head-of-state immunity did not cover acts 
of torture and conspiracy to commit torture committed after 
December 8, 1988, the date Britain ratified the Torture Convention. 
This is the most important holding in the case. Lord Goff dissented 
from this holding, arguing that Pinochet was entitled to immunity 
even for post-1988 acts of torture because neither the Torture 
Convention nor CIL abrogated former-head-of-state immunity.39 
Three features of the Law Lords' decision have special rele­
vance to this article. First, several of the Law Lords who embraced 
the head-of-state immunity holding drew a distinction between im­
munity in a criminal proceeding and immunity in civil litigation. 40 
They acknowledged and appeared to agree with case authority, es­
pecially U.S. case authority, supporting immunity in civil litigation 
for torture and other egregious acts. Second, the Law Lords looked 
to CIL to interpret the scope of British immunity law, in part be­
cause they concluded that British statutory law refers to CIL princi­
ples, but also because of the long-standing British rule that CIL is 
incorporated as part of the common law. Finally, six of the Law 
Lords expressed the view that the Home Secretary should recon­
sider his authorization of the extradition proceedings in light of the 
substantial reduction in the scope of the charges resulting from the 
Law Lords' decision.41 
New Authorization to Proceed. On April 14, the Home 
Secretary issued a second authorization allowing the extradition 
proceedings against Pinochet to go forward. The Home Secretary 
concluded, among other things, that the House of Lords' reduction 
of the extradition charges against Pinochet did not warrant dismis­
sal of the case.42 He noted that he had wide discretion in deciding 
whether to authorize extradition proceedings and that he had taken 
38. Lord Phillips dissented on this point, reasoning that the immunity statute gave 
Pinochet immunity only for acts committed in Great Britain. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 927 
(Lord Phillips). 
39. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 862 (Lord Goff). 
40. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 889 (Lord Hutton), 913 (Lord Millett), 921 (Lord Phillips). 
41. Several of the Law Lords also noted that if the Home Secretary did permit the pro­
ceedings to continue, the magistrate presiding over the extradition proceedings should care­
fully review the evidence concerning the remaining alleged crimes to ensure that these crimes 
satisfied the double criminality requirement. 
42. See 329 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Hansard) 311, 315 (1998) (statement of Jack Straw, Home 
Secretary). 
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a range of factors into consideration. 43 In addition to assessing the 
legal grounds for extradition, the Home Secretary considered a 
number of nonlegal factors, including "the possible effect of extra­
dition proceedings on the stability of Chile, and its future democ­
racy; and . . .  the possible effect of extradition proceedings on the 
UK national interest. "44 As of this writing, Pinochet remains under 
house arrest in England, and extradition proceedings are scheduled 
to begin in late September, 1999. 
B. International Law Uncertainties 
In the Pinochet case, three different judicial panels examined 
the immunity issue, and each panel adopted a different approach. 
Moreover, although most of the Law Lords in the latest decision 
agreed that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity for acts of tor­
ture committed after December 8, 1988, their reasoning in support 
of this conclusion is unclear and often contradictory. In this sec­
tion, we analyze the Law Lords' justifications for denying Pinochet 
immunity. Our analysis is not intended as an argument against the 
House of Lords' ultimate holding. Instead, our aim is to illustrate 
how open-ended and uncertain the law is in this area. 
A majority of the Law Lords suggested that a former head of 
state like Pinochet traditionally would have been entitled to immu­
nity for acts of torture under international law. 45 Most of the Law 
Lords also agreed that something happened in or by 1988 to limit 
this immunity. No clear answer emerges from the Law Lords' opin­
ions, however, as to how or why this limitation came about. 46 
A head of state's government holds the right to the head-of­
state immunity, and may therefore waive it. 47 One possible basis 
for the limitation of immunity, therefore, is that Chile waived im­
munity in 1988 when it ratified the Torture Convention. Any such 
waiver, however, must have been implicit, since the Convention 
43. Id. at 315. 
44. Id. at 316. 
45. See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 
855 (Lord Goff), 886 (Lord Hope), 903 (Lord Saville). 
46. Lord Phillips was the only Law Lord to deny the premise that former heads of state 
had a traditional immunity from criminal process under international law. He reasoned that, 
because national jurisdiction over universal crimes was a recent and rare phenomenon, there 
was in fact no CIL practice of granting former heads of state immunity from criminal process. 
See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 918 (Lord Phillips). 
47. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 902 (Lord Saville), 906 (Lord Millett), 924 (Lord Phillips); see 
also BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 340. For U.S. decisions to this effect, see, e.g., In Re Doe, 
860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) and In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th 
Cir. 1987). 
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does not mention immunity. As several Law Lords pointed out, 
implicit waivers of immunity are disfavored under international 
law.48 Perhaps for this reason, a number of the Law Lords dis­
avowed a waiver theory.49 Also inconsistent with a waiver theory is 
the Law Lords' agreement that the relevant date in 1988 was not 
the date that Chile ratified the Convention, October 30, but rather 
the date that Britain ratified it, December 8.so 
It appears, therefore, that most of the Law Lords relied on the 
theory that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated rather than waived. 
In other words, they concluded that something happened in or by 
1988 that overrode Pinochet's immunity as a matter of law. For 
some - and perhaps most - of the Law Lords, the abrogation 
stemmed from the Torture Convention.51 The Convention's abro­
gation of former-head-of-state immunity would not likely have 
been effective with respect to the circumstances of the Pinochet 
case until all three interested countries - Spain, Chile, and Britain 
- had ratified the Convention. This would explain the Law Lords' 
holding that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated as of December 8, 
the date of Britain's ratification, because Britain was the last of 
these three countries to ratify the treaty. 
The abrogation theory nevertheless suffers from a number of 
difficulties. In a world of equal sovereign states, it is unclear why 
an abrogation of immunity can be accomplished by a weaker show­
ing of consent than a waiver of immunity. A possible answer is that 
abrogation of immunity for torture was, as of 1988, a jus cogens 
norm - a rule of international law considered binding on nations 
48. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 882 (Lord Hope), 857 (Lord Goff), 904 (Lord Saville). 
49. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 886 (Lord Hope), 900 (Lord Hutton); see also [1999] 2 W.L.R. 
at 913 (Lord Millett) ("I do not regard [Chile] as having thereby waived its immunity. In my 
opinion there was no immunity to be waived."). But see [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 904 (Lord 
Saville) ("[I]t seems to me that the express and unequivocal terms of the Torture Convention 
fulfil any such [waiver] requirement."). 
50. One Law Lord thought that October 30 was the appropriate date, but he was none­
theless "content to accept" the December 8 date. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 887 (Lord Hope). 
51. We say "perhaps most" because the five Law Lords who believed that Pinochet's 
immunity was abrogated in 1988 invoked the Torture Convention in very different ways. 
Lords Browne-Wtlkinson and Saville thought that the Torture Convention per se abrogated 
Pinochet's immunity. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 904 (Lord 
Saville). Lords Hutton and Millett agreed that Pinochet's immunity claim could not survive 
the Torture Convention, but they left open the possibility that it was abrogated prior to the 
Convention because of torture's status as a jus co gens crime. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 897-99 
(Lord Hutton), 912 (Lord Millett). Lord Hope believed that Chile's ratification of the 
Convention was the event that abrogated Pinochet's immunity. He did not think that the 
Convention by itself caused this abrogation but thought instead that this was caused by the 
development of a CIL of international criminal law, of which the Convention constituted the 
final step. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 886-87 (Lord Hope). 
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regardless of their consent.52 However, while it is true that several 
of the Law Lords described the prohibition on torture as a jus 
cogens norm - and Chile apparently conceded as much53 - none 
of them described the abrogation of immunity as such a norm. In­
deed, several of the Law Lords who thought that Pinochet's immu­
nity had been abrogated denied that the jus cogens status of the 
prohibition on torture was enough, by itself, to abrogate 
immunity.54 
Another problem with the abrogation theory, as with the waiver 
theory, is the absence of any reference to immunity in the Torture 
Convention. The plain language of the Convention makes torture a 
crime without speaking to the issue of whether particular violators 
can claim immunity from foreign court prosecution. The immunity 
issue also appears nowhere in the treaty's legislative history, or 
"travaux preparatoires."55 These omissions seem especially signifi­
cant in light of the fact that the drafters of a number of other inter­
national crimes treaties and statutes have seen fit to override 
immunity in express terms.56 
52. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
332, 344 (defining a jus cogens norm as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which 
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character"). 
53. See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 841 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 
898-99 (Lord Hutton), 912-13 (Lord Millett), 924 (Lord Phillips). 
54. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
55. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 860 (Lord Goff), 884 (Lord Hope). The standard treatise on 
the Convention, which was coauthored by the Convention's Rapporteur (Burgers), is J. 
HERMAN BURGERS & HANs DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TOR· 
TURE (1988). This book mentions immunity only once. In its commentary on the require­
ment in Article 5 of the Convention that a nation establish jurisdiction over a torture offense 
cofillnitted within its territory, the commentary notes that 
[u]nder international or national law, there may be certain limited exceptions to this 
rule, e.g. in regard to foreign diplomats, foreign troops, parliament members or other 
categories benefiting from special immunities, and such immunities may be accepted in 
so far as they apply to criminal acts in general and are not unduly extensive. 
Id. at 131. As Lord Hope noted, this passage is "so cryptic as to defy close analysis," Second 
Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 884 (Lord Hope), but it does appear to recognize 
that CIL immunities may be consistent with the Convention, and it further suggests that the 
framers of the Convention did not specifically consider the issue of former-head-of-state 
immunity. 
56. See, e.g., Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals 
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 7, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 (contain­
ing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg) ("The official position 
of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Depart­
ments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punish­
ment."); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, art. 4, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 ("Persons committing genocide .. . shall be 
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private indi­
viduals."); Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Res­
olution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 
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These reasons probably explain why most of the Law Lords who 
relied on the Torture Convention to abrogate Pinochet's immunity 
rested their conclusion more on the purposes of the Convention 
than on its language.57 Because the Convention applies only to offi­
cial conduct, they argued that it would have little or no effect unless 
it abrogated official immunity. One strand of this argument empha­
sized that a former head of state is the person most likely to have 
been responsible for official acts of torture and thus should not be 
able to avoid the proscriptions of the Convention.58 Another 
strand emphasized that official immunities under CIL extend not 
only to heads of state, but also to other government officials carry­
ing out state functions. As a result, the argument goes, if immunity 
is not abrogated, "the whole elaborate structure of universal juris­
diction over torture committed by officials· [would be] rendered 
abortive. "59 
There are many potential objections to this purpose-based argu­
ment for abrogation of immunity.60 As Lord Goff's dissent noted, 
the availability of former-head-of-state immunity in foreign courts 
does not in fact negate the effect of the Convention. Most instances 
of torture by public officials will be committed in the state in which 
1 16 1, 1 194 (1993) (establishing the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and con­
taining that tribunal's statute); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCO R, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 6, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 l.L.M. 1598, 1604 (1994) (establishing the interna­
tional tribunal for Rwanda and containing that tribunal's statute) ("The official position of 
any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Govern­
ment official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punish­
ment."); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 27(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
183/9 (1998) ("[O]fficial capacity as a Head of State or Government ... shall in no case 
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence."). 
57. See Second Law Lor ds' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847-48 (Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson), 9 14 (Lord Millett), 925 (Lord Phillips). Only Lord Saville thought the 
"express terms " of the Torture Convention abrogated former-head-of-state immunity. See 
[1999] 2 W.L.R. at 904 (Lord Saville). The "express terms " Saville had in mind are contained 
in Article 1 of the Convention, which states that the Convention applies to torture "inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity." Torture Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, S. T REATY 
Doc. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. at 1 14. Counsel for Chile conceded that this 
language encompasses heads of state but argued that the language did not abrogate immu­
nity. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 854 (Lord Goff). 
58. See, e.g., [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) ("[I]f the former head of 
state has immunity, the man most responsible will escape liability while his inferiors (the 
chiefs of police, junior army officers) who carried out his orders will be liable."). 
59. [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
60. According to Lord Goff, the argument was raised for the first time during the second 
hearing before the House of Lords, had previously "been overlooked by fourteen counsel 
(including three distinguished Professors of International Law) acting for the appellants and 
for Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, " and "receives no support from the 
literature on the subject[,] and ... appears never to have been advanced before." [1999] 2 
W.L.R. at 856 (Lord Goff). 
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the official resides, where the Convention's prohibition on torture 
will apply without any international immunity defense. In addition, 
the Convention's criminal prohibitions could also be applied by 
other nations in cases where the former-head-of-state's government 
is willing to waive immunity. Another problem with the purpose­
based immunity argument stems from the belief of several Law 
Lords that torture was an international crime under CIL prior to 
the Convention. 6 1  These same Law Lords also believed that a 
former head of state retained immunity during this pre-Convention 
period. 6 2  Yet they failed to explain why official immunities were 
consistent with the international crime of torture established by 
custom but not consistent with the international crime of torture 
established by treaty. 
Perhaps the most significant problem with the purpose-based 
immunity abrogation theory derives from the Law Lords' insistence 
that current heads of state enjoy absolute immunity under inter­
national law for acts of torture even after the Torture Convention. 6 3  
The Convention criminalizes torture committed by public officials 
and others acting in an official capacity. It no more distinguishes 
between current and former heads of state than it does between 
former heads of state and lower-level officials. The logic of the im­
munity abrogation theory thus would seem to apply across the 
board to all public officials, or not at all. If immunity for current 
heads of state is not inc.onsistent with the purposes of the 
Convention, it is unclear why immunity for former heads of state is 
inconsistent with those purposes. Some of the Law Lords at­
tempted to address this problem by pointing out that current-head­
of-state immunity attaches to the office, whereas former-head-of­
state immunity and lower-level official immunity apply only to par­
ticular conduct. 6 4  This is simply to argue, however, that current­
head-of-state immunity is not abrogated by the Torture Convention 
because, unlike former-head-of-state immunity, it is absolute. This 
argument begs the question of why current-head-of-state immunity 
61. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 840-41 (Lord Browne-Wtlkinson), 886 (Lord Hope), 903 (Lord 
Saville), 911-12 (Millett). 
62. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wtlkinson), 886-87 (Lord Hope), 903 (Lord 
Saville), 912-14 (Lord Millett). 
63. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 844-45 (Lord Browne-Wtlkinson), 898 (Lord Hutton), 903 
{Lord Saville), 912 (Lord Millett), 915-16 (Lord Phillips). But see (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 852-53 
(Lord Goff) (concluding that the immunity would be absolute "except in regard to crimes in 
particular situations before international tribunals" (citing First Law Lords' Decision, (1998] 
3 W.L.R. 1456, 1474 (H.L.) (Lord Slynn))). 
64. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 902 (Lord Saville), 905-07 (Lord Millett). 
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continues to be absolute after the Torture Convention when 
former-head-of-state immunity has been restricted. 
In any event, this purpose-based theory of abrogation by the 
Torture Convention might not even have been the dispositive rea­
son for the Law Lords' holding. Many Law Lords reasoned, or at 
least insinuated, that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated in or by 
1988 not because of the Convention per se, but rather because of 
the status of torture as an "international crime" under CIL.65 The 
Law Lords were extraordinarily casual in their identification of tor­
ture as an international crime, relying in varying degrees on the 
writings of scholars, unadopted International Law Commission 
codes, and General Assembly resolutions that did not at the time of 
their issuance have the status of law.66 In addition, the Law Lords 
were imprecise regarding when torture became an international 
crime, and why. In these respects, the Pinochet decision continues a 
modem trend of identifying CIL not on the basis of customary 
practice, but rather on the basis of verbal consensus as reflected in 
technically nonlegal sources of law.67 
More important than the casual identification of torture as an 
international crime was the confusion among the Law Lords re­
garding the very meaning and significance of the term "inter­
national crime." Lord Browne-Wilkinson thought that state torture 
was "an international crime in the highest sense" prior to the 
Torture Convention but that the prohibition on torture did not ab­
rogate immunity until the time of the Convention because it was 
only at that point that torture was a "fully constituted international 
crime."68 By contrast, Lord Hope thought that, even after the Con­
vention, the prohibition on torture did not abrogate immunity un­
less the torture was "on such a scale as to amount to an 
international crime."69 Lord Hutton took issue with this point, ar-
65. Lord Hope expressly reasoned that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated by torture's 
status as an international crime, see [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at 882·83 (Lord Hope); Lords Hutton 
and Millett insinuated that this might be so, see [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at 899 (Lord Hutton), 9 1 1- 13 
(Lord Millett); and torture's status as an international crime figured prominently (though 
differently) in the opinions of Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Phillips, see [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at 
840-42 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 924-25 (Lord Phillips). 
66. See, e.g., [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at 840-4 1 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 853 (Lord Goff), 9 12 
(Lord Millett). 
67. For descriptions and analysis of this trend, compare Richard B. Lillich, The Growing 
Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. !NTL. L. 1 (1996) (argu­
ing in favor of trend), with Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights 
Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AuSTL. Y.B. !NTL. L. 82 (1992) (criti­
cizing trend). 
68. Second Law Lords' Decision, [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at 84 1, 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
69. [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at 885 (Lord Hope). 
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guing that, at least after the Convention, a single act of state torture 
is an international crime that abrogates immunity.1° Lord Millett 
agreed that Pinochet's alleged torture constituted an international 
crime, but he rejected the notion that Pinochet had a preexisting 
immunity from criminal process that needed abrogating.71 In addi­
tion to these points, some of the Law Lords emphasized that the 
international criminal prohibition on torture was a jus co gens norm 
or was subject to universal jurisdiction.72 As other Law Lords 
pointed out, however, neither the jus cogens status of a crime nor 
the availability of universal jurisdiction over a crime by itself elimi­
nates immunity.13 
In sum, a majority of the Law Lords concluded that interna­
tional law did not provide Pinochet with immunity from criminal 
extradition process in Britain. Their opinions, however, reveal sub­
stantial disagreement and confusion over why this was so. Even 
though the Law Lords had the benefit of briefing and argument by 
Britain's finest attorneys and international law scholars, the Law 
Lords could not agree even on which aspect of international law 
abrogated Pinochet's immunity or how this abrogation was 
accomplished. 74 
Ill. PINOCHET AND 'IHE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OVERRIDE STRATEGY 
Most international human rights law, like international law gen­
erally, applies only when there is a state action.75 As a result, im­
munities from suit for foreign officials guaranteed by both 
international law and domestic law constitute a major hurdle to 
human rights litigation in domestic courts. We have just seen that 
the Law Lords in Pinochet interpreted the Torture Convention and 
70. See [ 1999] 2 W. L. R. at 90 1 (Lord Hutton). 
7 1. See [ 1999] 2 W. L. R. at 9 12- 13 (Lord Millett). 
72. See, e.g., ( 1999] 2 W. L. R. at 898 (Lord Hutton). 
73. See [ 1999] 2 W. L. R. at 847-48 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 88 1 (Lord Hope). 
74. As we explain below in Part V, the vagueness of the sources and content of the inter­
national law at issue in Pinochet is typical of international human rights law in general, and it 
helps explain why the United States has been cautious in its incorporation of this law into its 
domestic legal system. 
75. Except for a few categories of conduct, such as genocide and war crimes, individuals 
acting on their own cannot violate international human rights law. This is true even for egre­
gious human rights abuses, such as torture. The Torture Convention covers conduct by "a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity." Torture Convention, supra note 
2, art. 1 (1) (emphasis added). Such private conduct presumably will violate relevant domes­
tic law, but it does not violate international law. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 
(2d Cir. 1995); Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 1 14 (5th Cir. 1988); 
Beanal v. Freeport- Mc Moran, 969 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. La. 1997). 
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CIL to limit Pinochet's immunity from criminal prosecution not 
only under international law, but also under Britain's domestic im­
munity statute. In effect, the Law Lords held that developments in 
international law abrogated Pinochet's immunity on the domestic 
plane. Plaintiffs in human rights litigation in the United States can 
be expected to invoke this aspect of the Pinochet decision as a basis 
for overcoming immunity hurdles in U.S. courts. 
The Law Lords considered developments in international law 
relevant to Pinochet's immunity in British courts because Britain's 
State Immunity Act limits former-head-of-state immunity to acts 
performed in the exercise of official functions,76 and the Law Lords 
interpreted this standard as incorporating developing international 
law standards. Ultimately, therefore, British domestic law deter­
mined the relevance of international law to Pinochet's immunity on 
the domestic plane. As we explain below, however, Great Britain 
and the United States have different rules governing how the inter­
national laws at issue in the Pinochet case operate within their do­
mestic legal systems. In the United States, the federal political 
branches have not authorized the incorporation of developing 
norms of international law to narrow the immunities available in 
U.S. courts, and federal courts generally have declined to embrace 
an "international law override" of these immunities on their own 
authority.77 Not only does the Pinochet decision not provide sup­
port for such an override in U.S. courts, in several ways it actually 
suggests reasons for rejecting one. 
A. Potential Relevance of Pinochet to U.S. Litigation 
In this section, we explain why immunity issues analogous to the 
ones at issue in Pinochet are likely to arise in the United States 
primarily in the context of civil human rights litigation rather than 
criminal extradition. We also explain how the House of Lords' con­
struction of the British immunity statute might appear at first 
glance to be relevant to this civil litigation. 
Criminal Extradition. Courts in the United States are unlikely 
to address the international law immunity issues presented in 
Pinochet in the criminal extradition context. To see why, consider 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23. 
77. There is nothing unusual in the fact that Great Britain and the United States have 
different rules concerning whether and how international human rights law affects domestic 
immunities for foreign officials. International law does not specify how nations must treat 
international obligations as a matter of domestic law, and nations often differ as to whether 
and how to incorporate international law into their domestic legal systems. See Lours HEN­
KIN ET AL., lNmRNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 153 (3d ed. 1993). 
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what would happen if Pinochet had come to New York rather than 
London for his back operation and, while there, the United States 
received an extradition request from Spain. Spain and the United 
States have an extradition treaty that provides for extradition for 
extraterritorial crimes.78 In addition, the United States has a crimi­
nal prohibition on extraterritorial torture similar to the one in Brit­
ain's Criminal Justice Act of 1988.79 For these reasons, Pinochet 
would potentially be subject to extradition from the United States 
to Spain for acts of torture committed in Chile.so 
But would Pinochet as a former head of state be immune from 
this criminal extradition process? Here there are large differences 
between U.S. and British law. As discussed above, the British im­
munity statute expressly provides current heads of state with abso­
lute immunity from criminal process, and it provides former heads 
of state with qualified immunity.81 By contrast, the primary basis of 
immunity for foreign sovereigns and their officials in the United 
States - the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act82 - applies only in 
civil cases. 83 Unlike in Britain, there is no statutory basis in the 
United States for current- or former-head-of-state immunity from 
criminal process. As we explain more fully below, the availability 
of such immunity in the United States is instead a largely discre­
tionary decision by the executive branch.84 Courts faced with offi­
cial immunity issues in a criminal extradition context do not look to 
international law; rather, they follow the wishes of the executive 
branch, which in turn makes its decisions without necessarily fol­
lowing international law.85 Because of this difference between U.S. 
and British immunity law, the immunity holding in Pinochet will 
have little effect on U.S. criminal extradition practice unless and to 
the extent that the executive branch decides to follow it. 
Civil Litigation. To say that the Pinochet decision has little rele­
vance in the criminal extradition context in the United States is not 
78. See Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Spain, May 29, 
1970, art. III(B), 22 U.S.T. 737, 740. 
79. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A (Supp. 1998). 
80. Unlike the British Extradition Act, the United States extradition statute does not 
purport to regulate either extraterritorial crimes or the principle of double criminality. See 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3184-95. Instead, these issues are governed in U.S. courts in accordance with the 
particular extradition treaty at issue. 
81. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
82. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 940583, 90 Stat. 2892 (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994)). 
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602. 
84. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
85. See e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997). 
June 1999] Pinochet 2149 
to say that it has no relevance in U.S. courts. · Courts in the United 
States have for years been grappling with international law issues 
similar to those presented in Pinochet in civil suits alleging viola­
tions of international human rights law by foreign officials. Indeed, 
the parties and judges in the Pinochet case drew heavily on U.S. 
civil litigation case law in assessing whether Pinochet was immune 
from criminal process in England.86 Plaintiffs in U.S. human rights 
litigation can be expected, in tum, to invoke the Pinochet decision 
in support of their efforts to overcome the immunity of foreign offi­
cials. To understand why Pinochet is not likely to support these ef­
forts, it is necessary first to review the statutory basis for human 
rights litigation and official immunity from civil suit in the United 
States. 
The principal statutory vehicle for international human rights 
litigation in U.S. courts has been the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).87 
This statute, which originally was enacted as part of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, states that federal district courts shall have jurisdiction 
to hear "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."88 
Although the statute rarely was invoked during the first 190 years 
of its existence,89 it assumed new significance in the 1980 Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala decision.90 That decision held that the ATS authorizes 
federal court jurisdiction over suits between aliens for human rights 
abuses committed abroad and that such jurisdiction is consistent 
with Article III of the Constitution.91 
86. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
87. 28 u.s.c. § 1350. 
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Tue original purposes of the ATS are uncertain. For various per­
spectives, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of Interna­
tional Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319, 357-63 (1997) [hereinafter The 
Current Illegitimacy]; Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J .  INTI.. L. 461, 475-80 (1989); William R. Casto, The 
Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Na­
tions, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 467, 499-510 (1986); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the 
Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INTI.. & CoMP. L. REv. 
221, 225-37 (1996); John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals "Violate" 
International Law, 21 V AND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 47, 48-60 (1988); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A 
Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INTI.. & CoMP. L. REv. 445, 446-
47 (1995). For the best textual analysis of the ATS, see John C. Harrison, The Law of Nations 
as Law of the United States in the Judiciary Act of 1789 (unpublished draft on file with 
authors). 
89. In 1975, Judge Henry Friendly referred to the ATS as an "old but little used section" 
and as a "kind of legal Lohengrin," and stated that "no one seems to know whence it came." 
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). 
90. 630 F.2d 876 {2d Cir. 1980). 
91. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. For a discussion of the Article III issue, see infra text 
accompanying notes 189-91. 
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The ATS does not purport to override the immunity of foreign 
governments or officials. As noted above, the principal source of 
immunity from civil suit in the United States for foreign govern­
ments and officials is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA).92 The FSIA provides foreign states with presumptive im­
munity from civil suit unless their conduct falls within one of the 
statutory exceptions to immunity.93 In Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,94 the Supreme Court held that the 
FSIA constitutes the exclusive basis for the exercise of jurisdiction 
over a foreign state, even with respect to cases that otherwise would 
satisfy the terms of the ATS.95 
The FSIA does not refer to suits against individual officials of 
foreign governments. Rather, it refers to suits against a "foreign 
state,"96 which is defined to include "a political subdivision of a for­
eign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."97 The 
FSIA's legislative history lists state corporations and agencies but 
not individuals as examples of what is meant by the term "foreign 
state."98 Numerous courts nonetheless have held that the FSIA ap­
plies to individual officials acting in an official capacity.99 These 
courts have reasoned that when foreign officials act within the 
scope of their official duties, their acts are the state's acts and must 
accordingly receive sovereign immunity.100 In addition, these 
courts note that if individuals were not covered by the FSIA, plain-
92. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994). 
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
94. 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
95. See 488 U.S. at 438. 
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602. 
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Agency or instrumentality is in tum defined as, among other 
things, "any entity" that is "a separate legal person." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (emphasis added). 
98. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 
6613-14. 
99. See, e.g., Junquist v. Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Phaneuf v. Repub­
lic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1997); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 
668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v. Philippine Natl. Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 
1990); Trujillo v. Banco Cent. Del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1343-44 (S.D. Fla. 1998); 
Granville Gold Trust-Switzerland v. Commissione Del Fallimento/lnterchange Bank, 928 F. 
Supp. 241, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996); Intercontinental Dictionary Series v. De Gruyter, 822 F. Supp. 662, 674 (C.D. Cal. 
1993); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); American Bonded Warehouse 
Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 653 F. Supp. 861, 863 (N.D. III. 1987); Mueller v. 
Diggelman, No. 82 Civ. 5513, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16970, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1983); 
Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see Republic of Philippines v. 
Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("[T]he sovereign immunity doctrine . . .  is 
not applicable to individual government officials."). 
100. See, e.g., Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101-02. 
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tiffs could render the statute ineffective simply by suing a state's 
officials rather than the state itself.101 
The FSIA's immunities for foreign states and officials are in ob­
vious tension with the international human rights litigation found in 
Filartiga and other decisions to be authorized by the ATS.102 And it 
is clear from Amerada Hess that the FSIA takes precedence over 
the ATS. To circumvent the immunity bar, plaintiffs in human 
rights cases have invoked ambiguities in the FSIA in an effort to 
persuade courts to recognize exceptions to immunity.103 In particu­
lar, they have argued in various ways that the FSIA should be read 
to permit an exception to immunity for gross violations of interna­
tional human rights law.104 Such a construction of the FSIA ap­
pears at first glance to be similar to the construction of the British 
immunity statute adopted by the Law Lords in Pinochet. As a re­
sult, plaintiffs in human rights cases are likely to invoke the 
Pinochet precedent in their efforts to override FSIA immunities. 
B. U.S. Rejection of the International Law Override Strategy 
As we explain in this section, U.S. courts have rejected attempts 
to create an international human rights law exception to the FSIA. 
These courts have relied on both particular features of U.S. law as 
well as broader constitutional principles. Given this reasoning, U.S. 
courts are unlikely to embrace the logic of the Pinochet decision. 
No general international law exception. The FSIA contains no 
general exception to immunity for violations of international law. 
As enacted in 1976, the FSIA contained a single specific exception 
relating to a violation of international law - an exception for cer­
tain takings of property.105 In Amerada Hess, the Supreme Court 
inferred from this exception that other violations of international 
law do not constitute exceptions to immunity under the FSIA.106 In 
a subsequent decision, the Court held that even torture - the con­
duct at issue in Pinochet - can be sovereign conduct subject to the 
presumptive immunity of the FSIA.101 
101. See, e.g., Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102. 
102. See generally David J. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INTL. L. 255 (1995/1996). 
103. See infra text accompanying notes 105-29. 
104. See infra text accompanying notes 108-14. 
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994). 
106. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 435-36 
(1989). 
107. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993) (reasoning that "however mon­
strous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the power of its police has 
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No jus cogens waiver exception. Faced with a rejection of a gen­
eral international law exception to immunity, plaintiffs and some 
commentators have proposed an exception for fundamental, or ''jus 
cogens, " norms of international human rights law.108 As noted 
above, a jus cogens norm is "accepted and recognized by the inter­
national community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted."109 Although the FSIA contains no gen­
eral exception to immunity for violations of international human 
rights law, it does contain an exception to immunity for situations 
where the foreign state "has waived its immunity either explicitly or 
by implication. "110 Plaintiffs and commentators have invoked this 
exception to argue that foreign governments waive their immunity 
by implication when they violate jus cogens norms of international 
human rights law, such as the prohibitions on genocide, war crimes, 
and torture. 
The three federal appeals courts that have considered this argu­
ment (or a variation of it) have rejected it.111 These courts have 
emphasized that the governing law is the domestic FSIA, not inter­
national law, and that the FSIA contains no jus cogens exception.112 
The most recent of these decisions noted that Congress amended 
the FSIA after the earlier decisions but failed to enact any general 
jus cogens exception to the FSIA, thereby suggesting that "Con­
gress is not necessarily averse to permitting some violations of jus 
cogens to be redressed through channels other than suits against 
long been understood for purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in 
nature"). 
108. For commentary to this effect, see, for example, Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, 
Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of 
Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REv. 365 (1989), Thora A. Johnson, A 
Violation of Jus Cogens Norms as an Implicit Waiver of Immunity Under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Ac� 19 Mn. J. INTL. L. & TRADE 259 (1995). For examples of similar 
plaintiffs' claims, see infra note 111. 
109. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 52, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 
334. 
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l). 
111. See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 
1996); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Siderman 
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Sampsom v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1123 (N.D. III. 1997); Denegri v. Republic 
of Chile, No. 86-3085, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233, at *11-12 (D.D.C. April 3, 1992). See 
generally Garland A. Kelly, Note, Does Customary International Law Supersede a Federal 
Statute?, 37 CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 507 (1999) (describing and defending these decisions). 
112. By contrast, one dissenting judge has argued that the FSIA should be interpreted 
not to give more immunity in this context than is conferred under international law. See 
Princz, 26 F.3d at 1176 (Wald, J., dissenting). That judge reasoned that "the clear import of 
international law is to disavow a foreign sovereign's claims to immunity where that sovereign 
is accused of violating universally accepted norms of conduct essential to the preservation of 
the international order." 26 F.3d at 1183. 
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foreign states in United States courts."113 The court also noted that 
"Congress might well have expected the response to [allegations of 
terrorism] to come from the political branches of the. Government, 
which are not powerless to penalize a foreign state for international 
terrorism."114 In short, courts have recognized that there are means 
of redress for human rights abuses other than civil suits in U.S. 
courts, and they have insisted that even the most fundamental 
norms of international human rights law do not override domestic 
immunities until Congress says so. 
No international treaty exception. Plaintiffs and scholars also 
have attempted to override domestic immunities for international 
human rights law violations by relying on the FSIA's treaty excep­
tion. The FSIA's presumptive immunity is "[ s ]ubject to existing in­
ternational agreements to which the United States [was] a party at 
the time of [the FSIA's] enactment."115 The Supreme Court in 
Amerada Hess interpreted this provision to apply only "when inter­
national agreements 'expressly conflic[t]' with the immunity provi­
sions of the FSIA."116 The Court further noted that a foreign 
nation does not "waive its immunity . . .  by signing an international 
agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit 
in United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action 
in the United States."117 A number of lower courts have con­
cluded, following Amerada Hess, that a nation's ratification of a 
human rights treaty does not constitute a waiver of the nation's im­
munity from U.S. judicial process unless the treaty itself contains a 
waiver or confers a private cause of action.118 
No human rights exception to head-of-state immunity. As we ex­
plain in some detail in the next Part, both before and after the en­
actment of the FSIA courts have looked to the political branches 
for authorization to apply head-of-state immunity.119 Because the 
FSIA does not by its terms refer to heads of state, most courts have 
sought this authorization from the executive branch in the form of 
113. Smith, 101 F.3d at 244. 
114. Smith, 101 F.3d at 244. 
115. 28 u.s.c. § 1604. 
116. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989) 
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615-16 
and S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 17 (1976)). 
117. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442-43. 
118. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1992); Saltany v. 
Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F. 
Supp. 1108, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
119. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
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an executive suggestion.120 In so doing, courts have recognized 
head-of-state immunity even in the face of alleged violations of in­
ternational criminal and human rights law.121 The basis and scope 
of former-head-of-state immunity are less certain,122 but nothing in 
the case law suggests a human rights exception to this immunity.123 
The discretionary function anomaly. Plaintiffs also have at­
tempted to create an international law override to the FSIA 
through its "non-commercial tort" exception, which denies immu­
nity for torts that cause injury or damage in the United States.124 
This exception in tum contains its own exception that preserves im­
munity for claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function."125 Courts 
are divided over whether illegal acts can be discretionary for these 
purposes.126 Most important for now, however, is the district court 
decision, Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 127 suggesting in this context 
120. See infra text accompanying notes 184-87. 
121. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting 
immunity to President Aristide of Haiti in a suit alleging violations of international human 
rights law); Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988) (granting immunity to 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in a suit alleging violations of international law relating to 
her assistance with air strikes in Libya); Kilroy v. Wmdsor, No. C 78-291 (N.D. Ohio 1978), 
excerpted in State Representation, 1978 DIGEST § 3, at 641-43 (granting immunity to the 
Prince of Wales in a suit alleging that he was responsible for human rights violations in 
Northern Ireland); see also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 24 (D.D.C. 
1998) (assuming that head-of-state immunity ordinarily would apply to "state sponsorship of 
terrorism" because such conduct involves a "decision made at the highest levels of 
government"). 
122. See generally Peter Evan Bass, Note, Ex-Head of State Immunity: A Proposed Statu­
tory Tool of Foreign Policy, 97 YALE L.J. 299 (1987). 
123. Most former-head-of-state immunity claims have been resolved on the basis of 
waiver. See, e.g., In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
817 F.2d 1108, 1110-11 (4th Cir. 1987); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 211 (S.D. Fla. 1993). 
Some courts have suggested in dicta that former-head-of-state immunity does not extend to 
private (as opposed to official) acts. See, e.g., In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 44 (dicta); Republic of 
the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 360 (2d Cir. 1986) (dicta); United States v. Noriega, 
746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dicta); cf. Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0207, 1986 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22541, at *17 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986) (noting, in response to claim of 
former-head-of-state immunity, that "[u]ntil such time as head of state immunity is made a 
creature of judicial interpretation, this court will not intrude on the prerogative of the execu­
tive branch to make such determinations"); Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209, 1252 (Haw. 
1998) (questioning, perhaps in dicta, the availability of immunity to former heads of state). 
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994). 
125. § 1605(a)(5)(A). See generally Sienho Yee, Note, The Discretionary Function 
Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: When in America, Do the Romans 
Do as the Romans Wish?, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 744 (1993). 
126. Courts holding that an illegal act can be discretionary include Risk v. Halvorsen, 936 
F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1991); MacArthur Area Citizens Assn. v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 
918, 922 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). By 
contrast, in Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431 (9th Cir. 1989), the court held that 
foreign officials did not have discretion to commit a clear violation of their own domestic law. 
127. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980). 
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that there is no discretion to commit a clear violation of interna­
tional law.128 The court concluded that Chile's alleged involvement 
in the assassination of former Chilean officials in the United States 
was not discretionary because it was "clearly contrary to the 
precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and interna­
tional law."129 
Letelier is the only decision of which we are aware suggesting 
that international law might abrogate immunity within the U.S. do­
mestic legal system. Even if the Letelier decision correctly inter­
preted the scope of the discretionary function exception, the 
decision has limited significance to human rights litigation because 
such litigation almost always involves human rights abuses commit­
ted on foreign soil, while the noncommercial tort exception applies 
only in situations where the injury or damage occurs in the· United 
States. In any event, the Letelier analysis is difficult to reconcile 
with the Supreme Court's later decision in Amerada Hess. The in­
sistence of Amerada Hess and its progeny that the only interna­
tional law-related exceptions to immunity under the FSIA must 
appear on the face of the statute likely sounded the death knell for 
Letelier's discretionary function analysis. 
Individual Capacity Suits. Although the FSIA is generally appli­
cable in human rights suits brought against foreign government offi­
cials, 130 some courts have concluded that certain human rights suits 
against individuals do not implicate the FSIA.131 These courts in­
terpret the FSIA to extend immunity only to individuals acting in 
an official capacity, and the courts look to foreign law to determine 
whether the individuals accused of human rights abuses were so act­
ing. If the alleged human rights abuses are not authorized under 
the foreign official's domestic law, these courts conclude that the 
abuses are beyond the official's scope of authority and thus outside 
128. Coincidentally for purposes of this article, that case also involved alleged conduct by 
Pinochet's government. 
129. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673; see also Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F. 
Supp. 379, 383 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (stating in dicta that "[k]idnapping, private imprisonment, 
and assassination are all beyond the scope of legitimate diplomatic operations and are not 
protected by the discretionary function exception, and courts have jurisdiction over a govern­
ment committing those acts"). 
130. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
131. See Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1994}; Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 
921 F. Supp. 1189, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 174-76 (D. 
Mass. 1995). This case law is not uniform; a number of courts have applied the FSIA to 
individual officials who allegedly engaged in abusive and illegal conduct. See, e.g., Herbage v. 
Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60, 67 (D.D.C. 1990) (alleged improper arrest and extradition); Kline v. 
Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (alleged expulsion from country without due 
process). 
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of the official immunities conferred by the FSIA. The absence of 
immunity in these cases does not tum on the foreign official's viola­
tion of international law. These cases thus do not represent an in­
ternational law override of the FSIA.132 
Congressional responses. Human rights activists often have 
complained to Congress regarding the limitations on human rights 
litigation, including the restrictions imposed by domestic immunity 
law. Congress's responses to these complaints have been limited 
and targeted, further confirming that immunity should be available 
even for human rights abuses unless and until Congress creates an 
exception. For example, in response to concerns that international 
human rights law might not provide a private right of action, 133 
Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).134 
This 1992 statute created a federal cause of action against foreign 
officials who under color of state law commit torture or extrajudi­
cial killings. Nothing on the face of the TVPA overrides the immu­
nities of the FSIA, and the TVPA's legislative history makes clear 
that the TVPA is "subject to restrictions in the [FSIA]."135 The leg-
132. Traditionally, the act of state doctrine might have precluded courts in individual ca­
pacity cases from inquiring into the validity of foreign acts under foreign law. See Underhill 
v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 252 (1897) ("[C]ourts of one country will not sit in judgment on 
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."). In Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964), however, the Supreme Court held that the act of 
state doctrine is based on domestic separation of powers considerations rather than (as previ­
ously been the case) international law. See 376 U. S. at 421-23. The Court expressed particu­
lar concern that judicial inquiry into the validity of foreign government acts might interfere 
with the executive branch's conduct of foreign relations. See 376 U.S. at 431-33. One conse­
quence of this new conception of the act of state doctrine is that the doctrine is limited to the 
official, public acts of a foreign government. Only an adjudication of those acts, courts have 
reasoned, is likely to embarrass the executive branch in its conduct of foreign relations. See 
Lynn E. Parseghian, Defining the "Public Act" Requirement in the Act of State Doctrine, 58 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 1151 (1991) (collecting cases). Invoking this limitation, some courts have con· 
eluded that the adjudication of alleged human rights abuses not authorized by a foreign gov­
ernment are not "public acts " and thus are not covered by the act of state doctrine. See, e.g., 
Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1471 (describing earlier decision); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 
1431-34 (9th Cir. 1989); Forti v. Suarez- Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
133. These concerns were fueled by Judge Bork's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), in which he argued that C IL does not 
ordinarily confer a private right of action. See 726 F.2d at 816-19. For three recent decisions 
refusing to imply a private right of action under international human rights law, see Heinrich 
v. Sweet, 1999 U. S. Dist. LEX I S  6669 (D. Mass. Apr. 30, 1999), Hawkins v. Comparat­
Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1999) and White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. 
Wash. 1998). These courts noted the adequacy of domestic legal protections, the limited 
nature of Congress's codification of international human rights law in the Torture Victim 
Protection Act, see infra note 134, and the fact that the domestic enforcement of interna­
tional human rights law is primarily the responsibility of Congress and the Executive rather 
than the courts. 
134. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (set forth in statutory note following Alien 
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)). 
135. H. R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88. The 
Senate Report similarly states that the TVPA "is not meant to override the Foreign 
June 1999] Pinochet 2157 
islative history further states that "nothing in the TVPA overrides 
the doctrines of diplomatic and head of state immunity."136 Simi­
larly, other human rights and terrorism-related statutes, such as the 
Genocide Convention Implementation Act137 and the Act for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, 138 do 
not purport to override immunities from suit. 
There have been many calls in recent years for Congress to cre­
ate exceptions to FSIA immunity for human rights abuses, and a 
number of bills to this effect have been introduced in Congress.139 
These efforts resulted in the enactment in 1996 of a very narrow 
human rights exception to immunity. This new exception removes 
immunity for torture, extrajudicial killing, and certain terrorist acts, 
but only when committed by nations that have been deemed spon­
sors of terrorism, and only in cases where the victim or claimant is a 
U.S. national.140 Only seven nations - Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria - are currently deemed sponsors of 
terrorism.141 Even in these limited circumstances, plaintiffs invok­
ing the new exception face an exhaustion requirement, discovery 
restrictions, and a statute of limitations.142 Against the background 
of Amerada Hess, this narrow and precise exception to immunity 
suggests that, in cases not covered by the exception, immunity re­
mains available even with respect to egregious human rights abuses. 
Sovereign Immunities Act . . . .  " S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991). The Senate Report also 
states, however, that "[t]he legislation uses the term 'individual' to make crystal clear that 
foreign states or their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances: only 
individuals may be sued." S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7. Because the courts had held long before 
the TVPA that government officials acting in their official capacities come within the FSIA's 
immunities, see supra text accompanying note 99, and since the legislative history makes clear 
that the TVPA was not meant to override the FSIA, the reference to "individuals" presuma­
bly means foreign officials acting in excess of their official capacities, for in this context the 
FSIA has been interpreted not to confer immunity, see supra notes 130-32 and accompanying 
text. 
136. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5; see also S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7-8 ("The TVPA is not 
intended to override traditional diplomatic immunities . . . . Nor should visiting heads of 
state be subject to suit under the TVPA."). 
137. 18 u.s.c. § 1091 (1988). 
138. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186 (1984). 
139. See Jeffrey Jacobson, Note, Trying To Fit a Square Peg into a Round Hole: The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations, 19 WHITTIER L. REv. 757, 
773-75 (1998) (recounting these efforts). 
140. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) 
(Supp. ill 1997). 
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). These nations are presently deemed to be state sponsors 
of terrorism under 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050) (1994) and 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1994). See 22 C.F.R. 
§ 126.l(d) (1998). 
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i), (f), (g). 
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In sum, U.S. courts generally have rejected efforts to circumvent 
the availability of domestic immunity for foreign officials by refer­
ence to international human rights law. Instead, they have treated 
questions of immunity as controlled by domestic law, and they have 
in a number of cases applied such immunity to alleged human rights 
abuses. The limited and targeted congressional interventions in this 
area only confirm the propriety of this approach. 
C. Back to Pinochet 
The U.S. practice with respect to domestic immunities in civil 
suits alleging human rights abuses confirms that "[w]hether and 
how the United States wishe[ s] to react to [international law claims 
raised in its domestic courts] are domestic questions."143 This point 
has special force in the context of civil human rights litigation, 
where the ideals of the underlying law clash with the exigencies of 
international politics. The federal political branches have resolved 
this tension largely, although not exclusively, in favor of immunities 
for foreign sovereigns and officials, even for violations of the most 
serious of international human rights law. Courts have deferred to 
the political branches on this point, and, as a result, have refused to 
countenance claims that international human rights law overrides 
domestic immunities. 
The U.S. approach to the relationship between domestic human 
rights litigation and international immunities differs from the 
British approach in Pinochet. As noted above, these differences are 
explained in part by differences in domestic law. Even at a broader 
level, however, the Pinochet case is not inconsistent with the U.S. 
approach. As several Law Lords acknowledged, there are impor­
tant functional differences between immunity in the criminal extra­
dition context and immunity in the context of civil litigation.144 
Whether in the civil or criminal context, one nation's examination 
of the validity of another nation's human rights record directly im­
plicates international relations. In the criminal extradition or pros­
ecution context, however, the executive branch has the duty, 
expertise, and discretion to accommodate such foreign relations 
143. Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 {9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
144. As Lord Millett noted, there is "nothing illogical or contrary to public policy in de­
nying the victims of state sponsored torture the right to sue the offending state in a foreign 
court while at the same time permitting {and indeed requiring) other states to convict or 
punish the individuals responsible if the offending state declines to take action." Second Law 
Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827, 914 (H.L.) (Lord Millett); see also [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 
892, 899 {Lord Hutton), 916 (Lord Phillips). 
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concerns. By contrast, civil human rights litigation is under the con­
trol of private plaintiffs, many of whom are noncitizens, and 
unelected judges. In this context, a broader and more rule-like ap­
proach to immunity doctrine makes sense. Otherwise U.S. foreign 
relations decision-making would in effect be delegated to foreign 
human rights victims and federal courts. However noble the aims 
of international human rights litigation, these actors are not well 
suited to assess U.S. foreign relations interests.14s 
In this regard, it is worth recalling that the Law Lords expressly 
encouraged Britain's Home Secretary to reconsider his decision to 
allow extradition proceedings against Pinochet to go forward, even 
though the Law Lords had determined that there was a valid legal 
basis to proceed with extradition. In other words, they understood 
that their decision would not be the final word on Pinochet's extra­
dition, and they believed that, even if the case for extradition were 
legally sufficient, it might be outweighed by political considerations. 
The Home Secretary ultimately ruled that the extradition should 
proceed. His decision, however, was based on just the sort of bal­
ancing of legal and political considerations-including the likely ef­
fect of extradition on Great Britain's relations with Chile and on 
Chile's internal stability-that is not available in private civil litiga­
tion.146 Because of the unavailability of such a balancing process, it 
is not surprising that the political branches would impose stricter 
limits in this context on the extent to which international human 
rights law developments can override domestic immunities.147 
IV. HEAD-OF-STATE lMMuNITY AND THE DOMESTIC STATUS OF 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Law Lords' use of international law to limit domestic im­
munities is not the only way in which the Pinochet decision is rele­
vant to international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. It also 
is relevant to the claim, often made in this litigation, that CIL is 
self-executing federal common law, to be "applied by courts in the 
United States without any need for it to be enacted or implemented 
145. It is important to keep in mind that the United States is unique in the extent to 
which it permits civil international human rights litigation between foreign parties. See 
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Ftlartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims 
Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. !NTI.. L. 65, 101 (1995); Beth Stephens, 
Litigating Customary International Human Rights Norms, 25 GA. J. !NTI.. & CoMP. L. 191, 
200 (1996). 
146. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
147. In Part V, we discuss more generally the United States' resistance to the incorpora­
tion of international human rights law into the U.S. legal system. 
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by Congress."148 This claim, which we have termed the "modern 
position,"149 has been central to the success of human rights litiga­
tion in U.S. courts because it allows for the judicial incorporation of 
international human rights law without the need for express polit­
ical branch approval. At first glance, the modern position resem­
bles the British rule, referred to by some of the Law Lords in 
Pinochet, that the law of nations is incorporated into the domestic 
common law.150 In addition, proponents of the modern position 
have invoked the example of head-of-state immunity, which was at 
issue in Pinochet, as a particularly compelling confirmation of the 
modem position. 
We have extensively critiqued the modern position in other 
writings.151 In this Part, we use the head-of-state immunity exam­
ple to further develop our critique. As we explain, U.S. courts his­
torically did apply something akin to the British rule of automatic 
incorporation of CIL, but that regime did not survive Erie v. 
Tompkins.152 Instead, courts after Erie have applied CIL rules, in­
cluding CIL rules of immunity, only when and to the extent they 
believe they are authorized to do so by the federal political 
branches. The failure of courts to embrace the modem position in 
the immunity context, where it would seem to be most justified, 
casts substantial doubt on the claim that it allows for the judicial 
incorporation of international human rights law. As a result, in­
stead of confirming the modern position, as its proponents have 
maintained, the example of head-of-state immunity actually weak­
ens the case for it. 
148. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 
1561 (1984) [hereinafter International Law as Law]. 
149. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815, 815 (1997) [here­
inafter A Critique]. As we have explained, the modem position is appropriately described as 
"modem" because it was embraced in a judicial decision for the first time in 1980, see 
Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980), and has risen to academic orthodoxy 
only since that decision, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at 831-37. 
150. See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 912 (Lord Millett) ("Customary 
international law is part of the common law . . . .  "); Heathfield v. Chilton, 98 Eng. Rep. 50, 50 
(K.B. 1767); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *67. The "law of nations" is the 
traditional term for customary international law. 
151. See Bradley & Goldsmith, A Critique, supra note 149; Bradley & Goldsmith, The 
Current Illegitimacy, supra note 88; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts 
and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Fed­
eral Courts]. 
152. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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To understand the significance of the head-of-state immunity 
practice for the modem position debate, it is important first to un­
derstand how U.S. courts traditionally applied CIL rules of immu­
nity, and how Erie v. Tompkins altered this practice. For most of 
our nation's history, head-of-state immunity was viewed as a com­
ponent of foreign sovereign immunity.153 Prior to Erie, federal and 
state courts alike applied the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity on 
the domestic plane without authorization from Congress or the Ex­
ecutive. Thus, for example, in the 1812 Schooner Exchange deci­
sion, the Supreme Court applied the CIL of sovereign immunity 
without bothering to consider domestic authorization to do so.154 
Similarly, in Hatch v. Baez,155 a New York court relied on an Eng­
lish precedent but no domestic authorization in holding that the for­
mer President of the Dominican Republic was entitled to immunity 
for his official acts. 
In these and other cases, state and federal courts applied CIL 
immunities as part of the "general" common law most famously as­
sociated with Swift v. Tyson.156 As a form of general common law, 
the CIL immunities were available as a source of law in domestic 
litigation. But this CIL did not have the status of federal law and 
thus had few implications beyond its use in particular decisions. 
State courts were not bound by federal court determinations of the 
content of this CIL or the procedures by which it was identified.157 
The Supreme Court could not review state court interpretations of 
the CIL of international immunity because such interpretations 
were not matters of federal law.158 And, although state and federal 
courts were bound by the Executive's determination of whether to 
recognize a foreign government, they interpreted the CIL of inter-
153. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812); REsTATE· 
MENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66 (1965); Peter D. Trooboff, Foreign State 
Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles, 200 RECUEIL DES CoURS 235, 252 (1986 V). 
154. See Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 147. 
155. 14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596, 600 (1876). 
156. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 1 (1842). 
157. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign 
Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1999); see also QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF 
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 161 (1922) (noting that a "state constitution or legislative 
provision in violation of customary international law is valid unless in conflict with a Federal 
constitutional provision or an act of Congress"). 
158. See Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Republic, 266 U.S. 580, 580 (1924); 
Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1924); New York Life Ins. Co. 
v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286-87 (1875). 
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national immunity independent of the views of the executive 
branch.159 
During the pre-Erie period, then, U.S. courts, in applying CIL 
rules of immunity, followed something akin to the British automatic 
incorporation rule. Erie's abrogation of general common law, and 
its insistence that all law applied by federal courts be grounded in 
the Constitution or a federal enactment, called this practice into 
question. Proponents of the modern position assert that after Erie, 
the automatic incorporation rule continued but that CIL assumed 
the status of self-executing federal common law rather than general 
common law.160 If this assertion were correct, one would expect to 
see courts embracing the modern position in the many international 
immunity cases decided in the years following Erie. But that is not 
what happened. Instead, around the time of Erie, the Supreme 
Court stopped applying the CIL of immunity on its own authority, 
as it had done under the general common law regime, and began to 
justify its application on the basis of executive branch authoriza­
tion.161 The law so applied was, to be sure, federal law. It was fed­
eral law by virtue of a political-branch authorization, however, and 
not an independent judicial power to incorporate CIL. 
The trend away from the automatic incorporation of CIL immu­
nity principles as nonfederal law to the authorized application of 
these principles as federal law began the year Erie was decided. In 
The Navemar, 162 decided just three months before Erie and issued 
the day Erie was argued, the Court intimated for the first time that 
courts were bound by executive suggestions of immunity.163 Subse­
quently, in its 1943 Ex parte Republic of Peru164 decision, the Court 
squarely held that, because immunity determinations implicated im-
159. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (granting immunity 
even though State Department had argued in the lower court that immunity should not be 
granted); see also White, supra note 157, at 134. 
160. See, e.g., Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 148, at 1561; Harold Hongju 
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1831-33 (1998) [here­
inafter State Law]. 
161. As noted in the House Report accompanying the enactment of the FSIA, "In the 
early part of this century, the Supreme Court began to place less emphasis on whether immu­
nity was supported by the law and practice of nations, and relied instead on the practices and 
policies of the State Department." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606. 
162. Compania Espanola de Navigacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 
(1938) [hereinafter The Navemar]. 
163. The Court stated that, upon receipt of a suggestion of immunity from the executive 
branch, it was the "duty" of the courts to grant immunity. See The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 74. 
For a discussion of how The Navemar constituted a break from prior practice, see White, 
supra note 157, at 134-41. 
164. 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
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portant foreign relations interests, courts were bound to follow ex­
ecutive suggestions of immunity.165 Two years later, in Republic of 
Mexico v. Hoffman,166 the Court went further, stating that even in 
the face of executive-branch silence, U.S. courts should look to "the 
principles accepted by the [executive branch]."167 As a result, the 
Court explained that "[i]t is . . .  not for the courts to deny an immu­
nity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an im­
munity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to 
recognize."168 These Supreme Court decisions formed the basis for 
the lower courts' consistent post-Erie, pre-FSIA practice of relying 
on executive branch guidance and principles to justify the domestic 
application of sovereign immunity.169 
The Supreme Court never expressly tied its shift in treatment of 
foreign sovereign immunity doctrines to Erie. But the shift took 
place at approximately the same time as Erie, and it is easy to un­
derstand why Erie was pivotal. Before Erie, the automatic applica­
tion of CIL as general common law had relatively few constitutional 
implications: it did not supersede state law or affect state court 
practice; it did not create a new basis for federal jurisdiction; and it 
did not bind the Executive. Once Erie eliminated this form of law 
in our constitutional system, however, federal courts could apply 
CIL on their own authority only as federal common law, with more 
serious constitutional consequences. If CIL were self-executing 
165. See 318 U.S. at 588-89. 
166. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
167. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35. 
168. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35. 
169. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d Cir. 
1971); Heaney v. Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1971); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria 
General de Abastecimientos y 'Ii:ansportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1964). See generally 
Monroe Leigh, Sovereign Immunity - The Case of the "Imias," 68 AM. J. INTL. L. 280, 281 
(1974); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim - The Haiti Case, 49 
N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 377, 389-90 (1974). Tue lower courts deferred to the Executive even when its 
suggestions were not consistent with CIL. See Leigh, supra, at 281 (citing Rich v. Naviera 
Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) and Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela, 
215 A.2d 864 (1966)). In cases in which the Executive made no suggestion of immunity, 
several courts stated that the matter was for "judicial determination." See, e.g., Flota 
Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th 
Cir. 1964); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 420 F. Supp. 954, 956 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281, 1282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974); Anaconda Co. v. Corporacion del Cobre, 55 F.R.D. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But these 
determinations were always guided by the State Department's policies as articulated in the 
Tate letter, see infra note 174 and accompanying text, and "several cases . . .  used the State 
Department's failure to intercede after being asked to do so as one basis for denial of immu­
nity," Lowenfeld, supra, at 390. See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 
480, 487-89 (1983) (noting that when foreign nations did not seek immunity from the execu­
tive branch, "the responsibility fell to the courts to determine whether sovereign immunity 
existed, generally by reference to prior State Department decisions"). 
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U.S. federal common law, then it would provide a basis for "arising 
under" federal jurisdiction under Article III, supersede inconsistent 
state law under Article VI, and might bind the President under 
Article II's "take care" clause.17° Especially in the absence of any 
apparent constitutional authorization for the federalization of CIL, 
it is not surprising that courts would seek political-branch authori· 
zation before embracing these changes in the domestic significance 
of CIL. As we have just seen, this is precisely what happened in the 
immunity context.111 
This posture was especially appropriate because, at the time of 
Erie, the CIL of immunity was in the midst of a transformation that 
rendered it less amenable to independent judicial determination. 
During the nineteenth century, the United States, like many other 
countries, adhered to the "absolute" theory of sovereign immunity, 
under which foreign governments were entitled to immunity for es· 
sentially all of their acts, even those that were purely commercial in 
nature.172 In the early twentieth century, however, a number of 
countries began embracing the "restrictive" theory, under which 
foreign governments were entitled to immunity for their public or 
sovereign acts, but not for their private or commercial acts.173 This 
shift to the restrictive theory, formally endorsed by the U.S. State 
Department in 1952,174 made the CIL of immunity much more com­
plex and difficult to apply.175 It also meant that foreign sovereigns 
170. For a discussion of these implications, see Bradley & Goldsmith, A Critique, supra 
note 149, at 838-48. 
171. A similar shift took place in the context of the act of state doctrine. This doctrine 
traditionally was justified by reference to the international law principle of sovereign equal· 
ity. See supra note 132. As we have just seen, however, Erie rendered problematic the auto­
matic incorporation of international law doctrines. It is thus no surprise that, at about the 
time of Erie, the Supreme Court began to reconceptualize the doctrine increasingly in do· 
mestic law terms. In both United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328-30 (1937) and United 
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-33 (1942), the Court grounded the doctrine not only in 
sovereign equality but also in the federal government's, especially the Executive's, broad 
power over foreign affairs. This reconceptualization culminated in Sabbatino, where the 
Supreme Court eschewed the international law basis for the doctrine altogether, justifying it 
solely in terms of separation of powers. By grounding the doctrine in such " 'constitutional' 
underpinnings," Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964), the Court 
provided a basis for concluding that there was domestic authorization to treat the doctrine as 
federal common law. See Bradley & Goldsmith, A Critique, supra note 149, at 859-61. 
172. See GAMAL MoURSI BADR, STATE IMMuNITY: AN .ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC 
Vmw 9-20 (1984) (outlining the pre-20th century history of the doctrine in the United 
States). 
173. See id. at 21-62 (describing the transition from absolute to restrictive immunity). 
174. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting 
Attorney General (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEPI'. ST. BuLL. 984, 984-85 (1952). 
175. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States - A Proposal for Reform 
of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 901, 906-09 (1969); Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sover· 
eign Immunity Claim, supra note 169, at 384. 
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would be hailed into court more often, thereby heightening the for­
eign policy stakes associated with immunity determinations.176 In 
this environment, it made sense that unelected judges with no for­
eign relations expertise would seek political-branch guidance on 
whether and how to apply foreign sovereign immunity.111 
B. Modern Practice 
It does not follow from the above analysis that case-by-case ex­
ecutive-branch authorization is the optimal process for the domestic 
incorporation of international immunities. This process was, among 
other things, politicized and unpredictable,178 and dissatisfaction 
with it eventually led Congress in 1976 to enact the FSIA.179 In 
effect, the FSIA transferred the political branch authorization for 
judicial application of foreign sovereign immunity from executive 
suggestion to congressional statute. The FSIA does not specify 
whether its immunities extend to heads of state, either current or 
former.18° The FSIA defines "foreign state" to include a "political 
subdivision" or an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state,181 
but neither the statute nor its legislative history mentions head-of­
state immunity.182 
This silence raises the question of whether a foreign head of 
state is entitled to immunity in U.S. courts after the FSIA, and if so, 
176. The Supreme Court had acknowledged the foreign policy implications of exposing 
foreign sovereigns to suit in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945). 
177. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpre­
tive Theory, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1785 (1997) (giving general theoretical account of why judges 
seek political branch authorization when judicial practices become political or controversial). 
178. See Lowenfeld, supra note 175, at 909, 913; Frederic Alan Weber, The Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. Woru.;o 
PUB. ORD. 1, 11-13, 15-17 (1976). 
179. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1983); GARY B. 
BoRN, !NTERNATIONAL Cxvn. LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES CoURTS 210-11 (3d ed. 1996). 
180. Mark Feldman, a participant in the drafting of the FSIA, explained the statute's 
silence on the head-of-state immunity issue as follows: "Frankly, we forgot about it [head-of­
state immunity), or didn't know enough about it at the time, during those two or three critical 
years when the statute was being formulated." Panel, Foreign Governments in United States 
Courts, 85 AM. SoCY. lNn.. L. PRoc. 251, 276 (1991) (remarks of Mark Feldman during panel 
discussion). By contrast, the sovereign immunity statutes in a number of other countries, 
including Australia, Canada, and of course Britain, expressly refer to head-of-state immunity. 
See Foreign States !=unities Act 1985, No. 196, chs. 3(3)(b ), 36 (1985) (Austr.), reprinted in 
25 I.L.M. 715; Act to Provide for State !=unity in Canadian Courts, 1982, R.S.C., ch. 95 
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 798; State !=unity Act 1978, ch. 33 (1978) (Eng.), reprinted in 
17 I.L.M. 1123. 
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994). The FSIA's definition of "agency or instrumentality" 
does not appear to encompass natural persons, since it refers to "any entity . . •  which is a 
separate legal person, corporate or otherwise." § 1603(b) (emphasis added). 
182. See Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: 
The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 169, 174 (1986). 
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on what basis. If the modem position were correct, the basis would 
be easy to find: head-of-state immunity, as part of CIL, would ap­
ply automatically as federal common law, notwithstanding the ab­
sence of political branch authorization. In fact, however, of the 
many decisions in which courts have considered and applied head­
of-state immunity since enactment of the FSIA, not a single one has 
applied head-of-state immunity as self-executing CIL. To the con­
trary, consistent with the post-Erie requirement that all federal 
common law be authorized by the Constitution or enacted federal 
law, these courts continue to seek authorization from the political 
branches to apply head-of-state immunity. 
Some courts, for example, view the FSIA as providing for head­
of-state immunity, even though the text of the statute is silent on 
the issue.183 Other courts view the FSIA as inapplicable to a head 
of state and instead look to executive branch authorization to apply 
the doctrine.184 Among the courts that seek executive branch 
authorization, some recognize head-of-state immunity only in the 
face of an explicit suggestion of immunity by the Executive.185 
Others rely on the lack of an executive branch suggestion simply as 
a factor weighing against immunity.186 Importantly, in all of these 
cases, courts ground head-of-state immunity in a federal political 
branch authorization.187 Contrary to the modem position, courts in 
183. See, e.g., O'Hair v. Wojtyla, No. 79-2463 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 1979), excerpted in State 
Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional Immunities, 1979 DIGEST § 7, at 897. More gener­
ally, a number of courts have construed the FSIA to confer immunity on individual officials. 
See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
184. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997); Lafontant v. 
Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Kilroy v. Wmdsor, No. C78-291 (N.D. Ohio 
Dec. 7, 1978), excerpted in State Representation, 1978 DIGEST § 3, at 641-43. 
185. See, e.g., Jungquist v. Nahyan, 940 F. Supp. 312, 321 (D.D.C. 1996). 
186. See, e.g., First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1121 (D.D.C. 1996); 
cf Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1212 (inferring absence of immunity for Manuel Noriega from execu­
tive branch's enforcement action against Noriega in Panama). Estate of Domingo v. Marcos 
provides a good illustration of the extent of executive control in this area. See Estate of 
Domingo v. Marcos, No. C82-1055-V (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 1982), excerpted in State Terri­
tory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional Immunities, 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST 1981-1988 § 7, at 
1564-66 (1995). The court initially granted immunity to Ferdinand Marcos based on an exec­
utive suggestion. Subsequently, the Executive changed its position and suggested a denial of 
immunity, and the court then followed that suggestion. See Estate of Domingo, No. C82-
1055-V, in 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST, supra, at 1568-69. Compare Estate of Doiningo v. Repub­
lic of the Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782, 786 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (denying immunity to Marcos 
and noting that "although the State Department filed a suggestion of immunity when Marcos 
was president, it has not filed a new suggestion of immunity") with Psinakis v. Marcos, No. 
C75-1725-RHS (N.D. Cal. 1975), excerpted in State Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional 
Immunities, 1975 DIGEST § 7, at 344-45 (honoring a suggestion of immunity for then-Presi­
dent Marcos). 
187. But cf In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating in dicta that "(w]hen lacking 
guidance from the executive branch, as here, a court is left to decide for itself whether a 
head-of-state is or is not entitled to immunity"). 
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this context do not assume that the CIL of head-of-state immunity 
applies as self-executing federal common law. 
C. Significance for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts 
This account of the way in which courts have treated head-of­
state immunity has important implications for the broader debate 
over the legitimacy of the modem position and, as a result, over the 
legitimacy of international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. 
The modem position has been central to this litigation for two rea­
sons. The first is a technical but important jurisdictional point. The 
typical international human rights lawsuit involves a foreign plain­
tiff suing a foreign official in U.S. court for human rights abuses that 
took place on foreign soil. The plaintiff usually sues under the ATS, 
which, as noted above, states that the federal district courts shall 
have jurisdiction over any civil action "by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States."188 The Article III basis for alien-versus-alien 
human rights cases is uncertain, however, because the parties are 
not diverse,189 and the plaintiffs do not (for reasons explained be­
low) seek relief under a treaty.190 Here is where the modem posi­
tion comes in, because if CIL is federal common law, then ATS 
suits can plausibly be viewed as "arising under" federal faw for pur­
poses of Article III. This indeed was the holding of the Filartiga 
decision that initiated the modern human rights litigation 
movement.191 
The second reason the modem position is important to human 
rights litigation concerns substantive law. Most of the principles of 
international human rights law invoked in domestic litigation are 
contained in multilateral treaties.192 U.S. courts cannot apply these 
treaties, however, for two reasons. First, the United States has 
failed to ratify a number of them.193 Second, when the United 
188. 28 u.s.c. § 1350 (1994). 
189. The Supreme Court has long held that alien-versus-alien suits do not fall within Arti­
cle Ill's diversity clause. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809). 
190. Article III includes within its categories of federal judicial power "Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under . . .  Treaties." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
191. See Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). 
192. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, lNrERNATIONAL LAw: PoLmcs AND VALUES 36 (1995) 
[hereinafter PoLmcs AND VALUES]; Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection 
of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 12 (1982). 
193. For example, the United States has not ratified either the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, B.T.S. 44 (1992), cm. 1976 (Eng.), 28 I.L.M. 1448, or the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
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States has ratified human rights treaties, it has insisted, through a 
series of reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs), 
that the treaties cannot be used as a source of law in domestic litiga­
tion.194 The modern position provides a way for courts to apply the 
norms in these treaties as domestic law despite this political branch 
resistance because, through a process that remains obscure and con­
troversial, human rights treaties are viewed as giving rise to an inde­
pendently valid CIL of human rights.195 Under the modern 
position, this treaty-derived CIL can be applied as domestic law in 
human rights cases even though the treaties themselves cannot be 
applied domestically either because of lack of ratification or be­
cause of the RUDs. In this way, the modern position "compen­
sate[ s] for the abstinence of the United States vis-a-vis ratification 
of international human rights treaties. "196 
Some of the problems with the modern position are apparent 
from this description of the relationship between the CIL of human 
rights and human rights treaties.197 It is generally accepted that 
federal common law must be authorized in some fashion by the 
Constitution or federal statute, and that federal common law is de­
fined and limited by the actions of the federal political branches.198 
As a result, it seems illegitimate for federal courts to apply as do­
mestic law a CIL of human rights based almost exclusively on 
human rights treaties that the political branches have taken pains to 
ensure do not apply as domestic law. Such a federal common law 
seems especially inappropriate because other federal enactments 
194. See generally Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The 
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM J. INn.. L. 341 (1995) (hereinafter Ghost of Senator Bricker]; 
David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The 
Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. RE.v. 1183 
(1993). 
195. For endorsements of this process, see HENKIN, POLITICS AND VALUES, supra note 
192, at 37-44; Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J, 
lNn.. L. 851, 856-58 (1989); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the 
Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. Rav. 1, 12 (1982). For criticism, see 
Simma & Alston, supra note 67; J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the 
Development of Human Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. LEGAL F. 609. 
196. Simma & Alston, supra note 67, at 87; see also Lillich, supra note 195, at 856-57 
(making a similar point); Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 151 (same). 
197. For a more comprehensive analysis of these problems, see Bradley & Goldsmith, A 
Critique, supra note 149. 
198. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("(F]ederal common law implements the Federal Constitution and 
statutes, and is conditioned by them."); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) 
("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to 
be applied in any case is the law of the State."). See generally Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking 
Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. Rav. 263, 286-88 (1992). 
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indicate political branch resistance to a wholesale federal incorpo­
ration of international human rights.199 
When attempting to justify the modem position, its proponents 
tend not to address these separation of powers objections to the 
automatic judicial incorporation of CIL. They concentrate instead 
on federalism objections, which they dismiss because of a purported 
need for national uniformity in foreign affairs. In addition, they 
avoid emphasizing international human rights law issues, such as 
the death penalty, because such issues implicate traditional state 
prerogatives and thus are difficult to justify as an exclusive federal 
concern. They instead point to traditional CIL governing relations 
between nations, whicp. appears to trigger an exclusive federal pre­
rogative and thus seems easier to justify as an exercise of federal 
common law. In particular, recent defenses of the modem position 
have rested heavily on the example of the CIL of immunity. 
Consider, for example, Harold Koh's recent defense of the mod­
em position.20° Koh reasoned that if CIL did not apply automati­
cally as domestic federal law, "Massachusetts [could] deny the 
customary international law protection of head-of-state immunity 
to Queen Elizabeth on tort claims arising out of events in Northern 
Ireland, whereas the forty-nine other states could choose instead to 
grant the Queen every conceivable variant of full or partial immu­
nity."201 Koh similarly suggested that rejection of the modem posi­
tion would mean that "federal judges sitting in New York diversity 
actions filed against Imelda Marcos, Lee Teng-hui, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, Yasser Arafat, or Pope John Paul II would have to 
guess whether the New York Court of Appeals would accord each 
or all of these defendants head-of-state immunity."202 Koh con­
cluded from these examples that it is "radical" and "bizarre" to 
question the proposition that CIL has the status of federal law.203 
Two points are worth noting regarding Koh's use of the head-of­
state immunity example to justify the modem position. First, the 
example is misleading to the extent that it suggests that the modem 
position is necessary in order to ensure state compliance with tradi­
tional CIL. In fact, the modem position is not needed for this pur­
pose because the political branches have already codified by treaty 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 133-42. For further discussion, see infra Part V. 
200. See Koh, State Law, supra note 160; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel 
Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623 (1998). 
201. Koh, State Law, supra note 160, at 1829. 
202. Id. at 1850. 
203. See id. at 1828, 1850. 
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or statute almost all of the traditional CIL that is relevant to domes­
tic litigation, rendering traditional CIL practically irrelevant as a 
rule of decision or defense in domestic litigation. Head-of-state im­
munity is a truly exceptional example of a traditional CIL norm 
potentially relevant to domestic litigation that is not expressly codi­
fied in enacted federal law.204 
Second, and more importantly, courts apply head-of-state immu­
nity in a fashion that is inconsistent with the modern position. They 
ground the application of head-of-state immunity in authorization 
by the political branches, usually the Executive. Modern position 
proponents invoke the head-of-state immunity example because it 
is a traditional rule of CIL that directly implicates relations with 
foreign nations and thus presents the best possible context in which 
to justify the modern position. But courts do not, in fact, embrace 
the modern position even in this most favorable of contexts. In­
stead, they seek political-branch authorization to apply CIL, and 
they take care to ensure that the law so applied conforms to the 
policies of the political branches. To return to one of Koh's exam­
ples, rejection of the modern position does not mean that courts 
would deny head-of-state immunity protection to the Queen of 
England. It simply means that they would not confer such immu­
nity directly under CIL, but rather would do so in accordance with 
the wishes of the executive branch, which has the lead role in con­
ducting U.S. foreign policy with England. 
This practice has important implications for the claim that a CIL 
of human rights applies as domestic federal law even in the absence 
of political-branch authorization. The CIL of human rights is more 
difficult to defend than traditional CIL as an area of federal com­
mon law. Unlike traditional CIL, the CIL of human rights overlaps 
substantially with traditional state prerogatives and thus should be 
federalized, if at all, only by the democratically elected federal 
political branches where state interests are represented.205 More-
204. Gerald Neuman contends that another such example is consular immunity. See 
Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to 
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FoRDHAM L. RE.v. 371, 377 n.37, 382, 391 {1997). CIL 
rules governing consular immunity, however, have been codified in the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, a multilateral treaty 
that has been ratified by most nations of the world, including the United States. See United 
Nations, United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary 
General, Chapter 3 (visited June 14, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Deptsffreaty> (registration re­
quired) (reporting that 163 nations had ratified this treaty as of June 1999). Since the U.S. 
ratification of the Convention in 1969, there has not been a single case in U.S. courts involv­
ing the CIL of consular immunity. 
205. See Thomas Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. 
RE.v. l, 17 {1985) (explaining why "[f]ederal courts . . .  should not promulgate federal com-
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over, the political branches have affirmatively resisted the whole­
sale judicial incorporation of the CIL of human rights.206 As a 
result, the modem position seems especially questionable in the 
context in which it most matters - international human rights 
litigation. 
The questionable basis for the modem position in the human 
rights context presents a puzzle. Why would courts embrace the 
modem position in the substantive human rights law context but 
not in the head-of-state immunity context, given that the justifica­
tions for the practice seem weaker in the former? The puzzle is 
solved when one sees that, contrary to academic assertions and ju­
dicial dicta, courts for the most part have not embraced the modem 
position with respect to the CIL of human rights. 
The decisions that come closest to embracing the proposition 
that a CIL of human rights applies as self-executing federal com­
mon law are in human rights cases litigated under the ATS. The 
watershed case, Filartiga, definitely relied on this proposition in up­
holding the constitutionality of the ATS.207 While later cases often 
repeat this proposition in dicta, they tend to apply a CIL of human 
rights in a fashion that is consistent with the political-branch au­
thorization requirement. For example, in the large majority of suc­
cessful international human rights cases, courts hold that Congress 
in the ATS created a domestic federal cause of action for violations 
of the CIL of human rights.208 Less often, courts hold that 
Congress in the ATS authorized courts to develop a CIL of federal 
common law.209 Some commentators have challenged these inter­
pretations of the ATS.210 The pertinent point for now, however, is 
that, rightly or wrongly as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
courts view the ATS as having authorized the incorporation of CIL 
into domestic law. 
mon law rules that intrude upon [the traditional domain of the states] unless they have been 
authorized to do so by an enacting body in which the states are represented"). 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 133·42, 194; see also infra Part V. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 91, 189-91. 
208. See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 
F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1991); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179-84 (D. Mass. 1995); 
Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 
1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1426-27 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
209. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996). 
210. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy, supra note 88, at 358-63; 
Alfred P. Rubin, U.S. Tort Suits by Aliens Based on International Law, INrL. PRAc. 
NOTEBOOK, Jan. 1983, at 19, 20-23; Sweeney, supra note 88; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 811-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
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Further evidence that courts do not view CIL as federal com­
mon law beyond the extent authorized by Congress can be found in 
judicial resistance to applying a CIL of human rights to domestic 
officials. If the modern position were correct, courts should apply 
the ostensible CIL of human rights, like other federal law, to do­
mestic officials. But federal courts do not in fact do so. They defer 
to congressional statutes that violate customary international 
human rights law.211 They generally do not apply customary inter­
national human rights law to limit executive action.212 In addition, 
although there is a widespread academic consensus that the CIL of 
human rights should override inconsistent state law under the 
supremacy clause,213 U.S. courts have never applied CIL in this 
fashion, and they show no inclination to do so. 
V. WHY RESIST THE DOMESTIC INCORPORATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW? 
We have argued in this article that the federal political branches 
have, with limited exceptions, taken steps to limit international 
human rights litigation in U.S. courts. In particular, they have 
granted foreign states and their officials broad immunities from suit 
and they have largely resisted the domestic incorporation of sub­
stantive international human rights law. We have further argued 
that courts should be, and generally have been, faithful to these 
political branch actions. Why have our elected officials resisted the 
incorporation of international human rights law into civil litigation? 
And why do we maintain that federal courts in such litigation 
should not play an independent role in the incorporation of interna­
tional human rights norms? 
Our answer to these questions is not based on skepticism re­
garding either the aims of international human rights law or the 
legitimacy of international law generally. It is instead based on the 
view that the use of domestic civil litigation to enforce international 
human rights law raises a number of serious problems for which the 
211. See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Yunis, 
924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 
1986). 
212. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666-70 (1992); Gisbert v. 
U.S. Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 
1453-54 (11th Cir. 1986). But see Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795, 798 (D. Kan. 
1980). 
213. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of 
International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 295; Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 
148. 
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federal political branches are and should be constitutionally respon­
sible. Those who argue for an open-ended incorporation of interna­
tional human rights law into domestic civil litigation tend to 
overlook or discount these problems. In this Part, we consider 
these problems in two contexts: the application of international 
human rights law against domestic officials and human rights law­
suits against foreign governmental officials. We conclude by noting 
several ways in which the Pinochet decision provides support for 
the United States' general resistance to incorporating international 
human rights norms into its domestic civil litigation system. 
A. Domestic Officials 
The federal political branches have taken significant steps to en­
sure that international human rights law cannot be applied in civil 
litigation against U.S. officials. The RUDs attached to the U.S. rati­
fication of human rights treaties render the treaties unenforceable 
as domestic law.214 On the rare occasion when the political 
branches authorize the application of international human rights 
norms in civil litigation, they do so only with respect to foreign offi­
cials, not domestic officials.215 The political branches have applied 
international human rights norms to domestic officials for genocide 
and war crimes, but these prohibitions can be enforced only by the 
Executive.216 Finally, although the modem position contemplates 
that CIL should be enforceable as federal law against domestic offi­
cials, even those courts that embrace the modem position do not in 
fact apply CIL to domestic officials, state or federal.217 
The federal government's disinclination to apply international 
human rights law to domestic officials has been severely criti­
cized.218 One problem with these criticisms is that they tend to 
214. See supra text accompanying note 194. Even a recent executive order by the Clinton 
Administration that purports to implement human rights treaties within the federal executive 
branch makes clear that "[n]othing in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive 
or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumen­
talities, its officers or employees, or any other person" and that "[t]his order does not super­
sede Federal statutes and does not impose any justiciable obligations on the executive 
branch." Implementation of Human Rights Treaties, Exec. Order No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 
68,991, 68,993 (1998). 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 134-42. 
216. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988); War 
Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (Supp. 1999). 
217. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. 
218. See, e.g., Mark Gibney, Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts: A Hypocritical Ap­
proach, 3 BUFF. J. INTI.. L. 261 (1997); Henkin, Ghost of Senator Bricker, supra note 194; 
Kenneth Roth, Side-Lined on Human Rights: American Bows Out, FOREIGN AFF., March/ 
April 1998, at 2. 
2174 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 97:2129 
overlook the extraordinary human rights protections the United 
States offers through its domestic constitutional and democratic 
processes. The Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction Amendments, 
and federal and state criminal and civil rights laws broadly prohibit 
governmental misconduct. It is true, of course, that these domestic 
legal protections are not always perfectly enforced. For example, 
many of the U.S. police and prison practices that Amnesty Interna­
tional recently described as violating international law219 are 
equally violative of domestic law. The problem in these contexts is 
not an absence of law, but rather insufficient enforcement of and 
compliance with domestic law. This serious and complicated prob­
lem is to some extent inevitable in all legal systems. Incorporating 
international human rights law into domestic law, however, would 
not redress this problem. 
We do not mean to suggest that international human rights law 
and domestic human rights protections are coextensive. In some 
instances international human rights law probably recognizes differ­
ent and more protective rights than those available under U.S. do­
mestic law. When these differences are examined closely, however, 
the United States' failure to incorporate international human rights 
norms appears less problematic than critics suggest. 
The U.S. Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, requires 
some of the differences. Thus, for example, the International Cove­
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)220 prohibits racial hate 
speech,221 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination222 prohibits racist propaganda and requires 
elimination of racist organizations.223 Because such speech and 
organizations in many instances are protected by the First 
Amendment, the United States entered reservations refusing to ac-
219. See AMNEsTY lNrERNATIONAL, Rimrrs FOR ALL 17-86 (1998). 
220. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, S. 
fame. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
221. See id. art. 20(2), S. EXEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 29, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178 (prohibiting 
"[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimi­
nation, hostility or violence"). 
222. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
223. See id. art. 4(a), S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 3, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220 (requiring nations 
to punish by law "all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred"); id. art. 
4(b), S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 3-4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220 (requiring nations to "declare illegal 
and prohibit," and to punish participation in, organizations that "promote and incite racial 
discrimination"); id. art. 7, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 5, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222 (requiring nations 
to "adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, 
culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial 
discrimination"). 
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cept these obligations.224 Even in the absence of such reservations, 
any political branch consent to these norms would be unenforce­
able as domestic law.225 
Many of the other supposed differences between the require­
ments of international human rights law and U.S. domestic law are 
based on tendentious constructions of the relevant human rights 
norms, constructions made possible by the vague way in which 
these norms are identified and crafted. This vagueness is in tum a 
principal reason why the United States does not authorize courts to 
apply this law against domestic officials. 
International human rights law is vague along two dimensions. 
The first type of vagueness concerns the criteria for identifying the 
appropriate sources of CIL. Traditionally, a nation was bound 
under CIL only to the international obligations to which it had im­
plicitly given its consent through customary practice.226 As under­
stood by human rights advocates and some courts, modem 
international human rights law significantly weakens, if not elimi­
nates, these consent and customary practice requirements for 
CIL.227 "Customary" international human rights law does not de­
pend on actual consent or actual practice, but rather depends on an 
"international consensus" constituted by an uncertain brew of 
treaty norms (ratified or not), General Assembly resolutions, inter­
national commissions, and academic commentators.228 Thus, for 
example, some of the Law Lords in the Pinochet decision thought 
224. See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna­
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CoNG. REc. 
14,326 (1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna­
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CoNG. REc. 8070-71 (1992). The Genocide 
Convention too contains a reservation stating that the United States does not accept any 
obligation prohibited by its Constitution. See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent 
to Ratification of the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, 132 CoNG. REc. 2349 (1986). 
225. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) ("[I]t is well-established that 'no agree­
ment with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of 
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."' (quoting Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957))). 
226. See MARK W. JANis, AN INrn.oouCTioN TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-43 (3d ed. 
1999); see also, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (noting that the law of 
nations is derived in part from "the customs and usages of civilizec;l nations"); The Antelope, 
23 U.S. 66, 120-22 (1825) (observing that the law of nations is derived from "the usages, the 
national acts, and the general assent" of the nations of the world). 
227. See HENKIN, PoLmcs AND VALUES, supra note 192, at 37-38; Blum & Steinhardt, 
supra note 7, at 64-75; Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1982). 
228. See HENKIN, PoLmcs AND VALUES, supra note 192, at 38; JANIS, supra note 226, at 
103-04; Randall, Federal Questions, supra note 6, at 388-93; Steinhardt, supra note 145, at 79-
81; see also, e.g., Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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that, based on General Assembly pronouncements and the writings 
of scholars, CIL prohibited torture long before ratification of the 
Torture Convention.229 Similarly, many commentators claim that 
the U.S. practice of executing juvenile offenders for capital crimes 
violates international law, even though this U.S. practice is long­
standing, and the United States has expressly declined to consent to 
treaties outlawing the practice.230 
A second type of vagueness exacerbates the uncertainty prob­
lem: even when the source of international human rights law is 
clear, as is the case with application of duly ratified treaties, the 
content of the norms embodied in the law is often exceedingly 
vague. Of course, the language of pertinent U.S. constitutional and 
other protections is sometimes similarly vague. These vague do­
mestic provisions, however, have been given more precise content 
through hundreds and sometimes thousands of judicial decisions. 
This large body of interpretive case law certainly does not render 
the domestic provisions determinant in all contexts. But it does 
provide a broad core of settled meaning at any particular point in 
time that sharply contrasts with analogous international provisions. 
Consider the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on "unreasona­
ble searches and seizures,"231 which is perhaps a paradigmatic ex­
ample of an open-ended and indeterminate constitutional 
provision. Its requirements have changed over time, and when ap­
plied in novel contexts it might well provide little if any real gui­
dance. Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted 
in thousands of different cases, and these precedents provide police 
officials at any particular time with significant guidance.232 The 
same cannot be said, for example, of the ICCPR's analogous prohi­
bition on "arbitrary arrest or d etention. " 233 The Fourth 
Amendment and the ICCPR provision are similarly vague as writ-
229. See, e.g., Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827, 903 (H.L.) (Lord 
Saville), 912 (Lord Millett). 
230. See, e.g., Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of Inter­
national Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 
(1983); Julian S. Nicholls, Too Young to Die: International Law and the Imposition of the 
Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States, 5 EMORY !Nn.. L. REV. 617 (1991); David Weissb­
rodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the United States Violates International Human 
Rights Law, 3 AM. U. J. !Nn.. L. & PoLY. 339 (1988). 
231. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
232. For an overview of what is generally settled in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
and what is not, see Twenty-Seventh Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1153, 1187-1352 (1998). 
233. See ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 9(1), S. EXEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 
175. 
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ten, but the Fourth Amendment is relatively more determinant in 
practice because of the judicial precedents interpreting it. 
The vague content of international human rights norms places 
the United States in a difficult position. The aims of international 
human rights law are often desirable, and it is hard to disagree with 
the content of much of this law considered in the abstract. If this 
law were incorporated into the U.S. legal system, however, it could 
have profound and unforeseen effects on U.S. domestic law. 
Although the provisions in human rights treaties often appear to be 
similar to the protections available under U.S. domestic law, they 
are couched in different terms and it is therefore impossible to pre­
dict how these new sources of law would be interpreted and applied 
by U.S. judges. 
This uncertainty is illustrated by examples from the ICCPR, 
perhaps the most important of all human rights treaties. How 
would the ICCPR's prohibition on "arbitrary arrest and deten­
tion"234 affect the constitutional practice of checkpoint sobriety 
stops?235 How would its requirement that an arrestee "be brought 
promptly before a judge"236 affect the generally constitutional prac­
tice of conducting arraignments within 48 hours of arrest?237 
Would its requirement that every "human being" have an "inherent 
right to life" that "shall be protected by law"238 strengthen, weaken, 
or have no effect on otherwise-legal parental µotification require­
ments for juvenile abortions?239 Would the ICCPR's guarantee of 
an "enforceable right to compensation" for "[a]nyone who has 
been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention"240 override other­
wise-legitimate qualified immunity defenses?241 How would the re­
quirement that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of 
234. See id. 
235. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that 
sobriety checkpoints are legal under the Fourth Amendment). 
236. ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 9(3), S. fame. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175. 
237. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58-59 (1991) (holding that 
Fourth Amendment's "promptness" requirement generally is satisfied by arraignment within 
48 hours). 
238. ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 6(1), S. fame. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. 
239. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297-99 (1997) (upholding constitutionality of 
certain parental notification requirements). 
240. ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 9(5), S. fame. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. 176 
(emphasis added). 
241. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-56 (1986) (recognizing qualified immunity 
defense for unlawful arrests). 
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the human person"2 42 affect controversial but constitutional prison 
practices?2 43 There are scores of similar uncertainties, under both 
the ICCPR and other human rights treaties. 
The vagueness of international human rights law is even more 
severe in the context of CIL. In that context, there is no text, and 
no settled list of sources, to guide interpretation. Moreover, as 
noted above, the objective "state practice" component of CIL has 
been relaxed in the human rights context.2 4 4  The open-ended na­
ture of the CIL of human rights is illustrated by the rapidly ex­
panding claims regarding its content. As late as 1986, the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States limited the list of CIL human rights norms to prohibitions 
against extremely egregious conduct such as torture and geno­
cide. 245 Since that time, commentators have argued that CIL in­
cludes a wide range of additional rights, including rights relating to 
the death penalty, gender violence, and the environment.2 46 And 
the list keeps growing. As Ted Meron has observed, "given the 
rapid continued development of international human rights, the list 
as now constituted should be regarded as essentially open­
ended. . . . Many other rights will be added in the course of 
time."2 47 
The difficulties associated with ascertaining the content of vague 
human rights norms are heightened by the fact that the body of 
interpretive materials that will eventually provide this content will 
not necessarily be based on considerations of U.S. law and policy. 
The United States has no privileged say regarding how the vague 
norms of international human rights law will come to be viewed in 
practice. Such meaning will be determined by the decentralized de­
cisions of a variety of national courts, human rights commissions, 
other international law bodies, and the writings of scholars. 
Although these decisions may in some instances comport with the 
views of U.S. policymakers, there is no guarantee that this will be 
the case. 
242. ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 10(1), S. EXEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176. 
243. See Patrick J.A. McClain et al., Prisoners' Rights: Substantive Rights Retained by 
Prisoners, 86 GEo. L.J. 1953, 1953-88 (1998). 
244. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text. 
245. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 702. 
246. See, e.g., BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LmoATION IN U.S. CoURTS 86-94 (1996). 
247. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY 
LAW 99 (1989). 
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This profound uncertainty regarding the actual content of 
human rights norms gives the United States a legitimate reason not 
to incorporate international human rights law into domestic law. 
International law does not require any particular manner of domes­
tic implementation of its obligations, and many nations, including 
Great Britain, view all treaties as non-self-executing. The United 
States has taken the position that its obligations under the human 
rights treaties are fully met by its domestic legal protections, includ­
ing, sometimes, domestic legislation implementing particular inter­
national obligations. This is a perfectly legitimate method of 
respecting international obligations. It is hard to know for sure, of 
course, whether U.S. domestic legal protections fully meet the re­
quirements of the vague treaty requirements. This is one reason 
why the United States, in addition to declaring the human rights 
treaties to be non-self-executing, attaches understandings that clar­
ify its obligations and narrowly defined reservations that exclude 
obligations it cannot meet. 
This practice is especially understandable given that the United 
States provides extraordinary - though of course far from perfect 
- human rights protections through its domestic constitutional and 
political processes. The United States agrees with many of the obli­
gations in the treaties, at least in the abstract terms in which the 
obligations are couched; thus it assents to many of these obligations 
in its ratifications. Because these obligations are so uncertain in 
practice, however, the United States makes clear that it under­
stands the obligations largely to coincide with United States domes­
tic law and practice, which, at least in comparison, is relatively 
clear.248 This practice does not, as so many commentators claim, 
show contempt for international law. By ensuring that the United 
States does not assume international obligations that it is not pre­
pared to comply with, it arguably shows just the opposite. 
248. For examples of such statements in connection with U.S. ratification of human rights 
treaties, see U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna­
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. RE.c. 
14,326 {1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna­
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CoNG. RE.c. 8070-71 (1992); U.S. Senate 
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CoNG. RE.c. 36198-99 
{1990); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 132 CONG. RE.c. 
2349-50 {1986). 
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B. Foreign Officials 
The political branches and the courts have been somewhat more 
receptive to applying international human rights law against foreign 
officials. Even in this context, however, the application of interna­
tional human rights law has been quite limited. Filartiga and its 
progeny have allowed international human rights lawsuits against 
foreign officials to proceed under the ATS. As noted above, how­
ever, the Supreme Court has made it clear that such ATS suits are 
limited by foreign sovereign immunity.249 In addition, in the few 
instances in which the political branches have expressly provided 
for the application of international human rights law against foreign 
officials - for example, in the Torture Victim Protection Act and 
the recent terrorism amendments to the FSIA - they sharply lim­
ited the types of actions that can be brought, and they also imposed 
significant procedural limitations on these actions.250 
At first glance, these limitations seem surprising. The United 
States has long been a champion of human rights, and it frequently 
exercises moral, economic, and military pressure against govern­
ments perceived as violating those rights. Why, in this light, would 
the United States resist broad application of international human 
rights law against foreign officials in U.S. courts? 
Part of the answer has to do with fairness concerns implicated 
by the substantive and procedural vagueness of international 
human rights law. The norms applied under the Filartiga rubric are 
generated by the unstructured and open-ended CIL-identification 
process discussed above. Moreover, the Filartiga approach pro­
vides no guidance on important procedural issues like statutes of 
limitation, retroactivity, and exhaustion. The uncertainties in the 
Filartiga process become clear when one compares it to a rare polit­
ical branch incorporation of international human rights law - the 
TVPA. The TVPA defined the new federal causes of action for tor­
ture and extrajudicial killing with a careful precision that contrasts 
with the vague contours of analogous CIL and Torture Convention 
prohibitions.251 It provided a statute of limitations designed to 
249. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
250. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36. 
251. The TVPA's definitions of torture and extrajudicial killing are narrower than those 
definitions under CIL and the Torture Convention. They track the definitions adopted by 
the Senate's understanding of the requirements of the Torture Convention, which was a con­
dition to the Senate's consent to ratification of the treaty. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 6 
(1991). 
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avoid stale claims252 and included an exhaustion requirement 
designed to avoid unnecessary interference with foreign nations and 
undue burden on U.S. courts.253 
This latter consideration points to an even more serious concern 
regarding the foreign relations implications that inhere in a civil 
human rights suit brought against a foreign governmental official. 
Such a lawsuit obviously can affect the relations between the nation 
permitting the lawsuit and the nation whose officials are subject to 
the lawsuit. This foreign relations concern has led most nations of 
the world to permit their courts to apply human rights law against 
foreign government officials only in criminal suits under the control 
of the executive branch. Both the British and Spanish torture stat­
utes at issue in the Pinochet litigation contain this limitation. 
The United States appears to be unique in opening its courts to 
civil suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign governmental officials 
for human rights violations that occurred on foreign soil.254 The 
revival of the long-dormant ATS in a context far removed from its 
original purposes may not have happened by accident,255 but it did 
not come about through a democratic process. Although private 
suits under the ATS have sometimes met with the approval of the 
executive branch when the private plaintiffs' interests have coin­
cided with U.S. foreign policy aims,256 no mechanism in ATS litiga­
tion ensures this overlap.257 Instead, private litigants make the 
decisions regarding when to bring these lawsuits, which countries to 
252. See Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(c), 106 Stat. 73, 73 
(1992) (set forth in statutory note following Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)); see 
also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88 (statute of 
limitations requirement "insures that the Federal Courts will not have to hear stale claims"). 
253. See § 2(b), 106 Stat. at 73; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (exhaustion require­
ment "ensures that U.S. courts will not intrude into cases more appropriately handled by 
courts where the alleged torture or killing occurred" and avoids "exposing U.S. courts to 
unnecessary burdens"). 
254. See supra note 145. 
255. For a discussion of the role of the Center for Constitutional Rights in the Filartiga 
case, see STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 246, at 9-10. 
256. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 
232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069); Amicus Curiae Brief by the United States 
Departments of Justice and State, Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-
6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980). But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu­
riae, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989) (No. 86-2448), excerpted in State 
Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional Immunities, 2 CuMULATIVE DIGEST 1981-1988 § 7, 
at 1571-72 (brief from Reagan administration objecting to the use of the ATS for human 
rights litigation). 
257. In suits against leaders of foreign countries, the Executive does have the ability to 
stop human rights litigation by suggesting head-of-state immunity, and it has done so in a 
number of instances. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. Most human rights 
lawsuits, however, do not implicate head-of-state immunity; in those cases, the Executive is 
left with, at most, an amicus curiae role. 
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target, and what relief to seek. Neither these litigants, nor the 
judges hearing these cases, possess the expertise and constitutional 
authority to weigh the benefits of the litigation against its political 
costs.258 Moreover, this litigation is highly decentralized and ad 
hoc, and it is subject to a variety of procedural restraints that do not 
apply to the political process. 
These features of U.S. civil litigation help explain why the exec­
utive branch has sometimes opposed even very limited measures 
aimed at incorporating international human rights law into such liti­
gation. Thus, for example, the Bush administration initially op­
posed the TVPA259 and the Clinton administration initially opposed 
the 1996 amendments to the FSIA,260 both on the ground that even 
these limited endorsements of international human rights litigation 
would, on balance, harm U.S. foreign relations machinery. For a 
similar reason, President Clinton recently declined to exercise his 
authority under 1998 Amendments to the FSIA to assist plaintiffs in 
recovering human rights judgments against Iran and Cuba.261 As 
258. See generally Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International Civil 
Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & PoLY. INTL. Bus. 461 
{1993); John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms· 
Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INTL. & CoMP. L.R. 747, 772-75 {1997). 
259. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and R.R. 1662 Before 
the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 8 {1990) (written and oral testimony by John 0. McGinnis, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice and David 
P. Stewart, Assistant Legal Advisor for Human Rights and Refugee Affairs, U.S. Depart· 
ment of State). President Bush did eventually sign the TVPA legislation. Upon signing it, 
however, he expressed concern that "U.S. courts may become embroiled in difficult and sen­
sitive disputes in other countries, and possibly ill-founded or politically motivated suits, 
which have nothing to do with the United States and which offer little prospect of successful 
recovery" and that "(s]uch potential abuse of this statute undoubtedly would give rise to 
serious frictions in international relations and would also be a waste of our own limited and 
already overburdened judicial resources." Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protec­
tion Act of 1991, Mar. 12, 1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 465, 466 {Mar. 16, 1992). 
260. See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts and Admin. Practices of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 
{1994) (statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor to U.S. State Department); 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Ad­
min. Practices of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. {1994) (statement 
of Stuart Schifter, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of 
Justice). 
261. In 1998, Congress amended the FSIA to provide for attachment and execution of 
otherwise-blocked assets and government assistance in locating the assets in suits against 
state sponsors of terrorism. See Pub. L. No. 105-277,,§ 117, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-491 to 2681-
492 {codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1610{f){l){A), (l){B), {2){A), {2)(B) (Supp. 
1999)). Subsection (d) of the 1998 amendment permits the President to waive its require­
ments "in the interest of national security." See § 117(d) (codified as amended at statutory 
note following 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610 (Supp. 1999) ). The President invoked subsection ( d) in an 
attempt to waive application of the 1998 amendment in its entirety. See Memorandum on 
Blocked Property of Terrorist-List States, Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 34 WEEKLY 
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2088 (Oct. 21, 1998); see also President's Statement on Signing the Omni-
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these examples illustrate, the incorporation of international human 
rights law into the U.S. civil litigation system implicates significant 
foreign relations issues. These issues, as we argued above, are best 
resolved by the political branches in the first instance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Pinochet is a significant decision on many levels. Despite the 
Law Lords' narrowing of the extradition charges against Pinochet, 
and the fact that Pinochet might well never stand trial in Spain, the 
decision is a major victory for the idea that international law can 
regulate domestic human rights abuses. More broadly, the decision 
has sparked important debates over the legitimacy and efficacy of 
unilateral assertions of universal jurisdiction, the relationship be­
tween the exercise of this jurisdiction and political solutions (like 
amnesties) in the state where the bulk of the human rights abuses 
occur, and the virtues and vices of an international criminal court to 
try human rights abuses.262 
Pinochet also is significant because it shows that international 
law and the mechanisms of its enforcement are changing. Recent 
developments in international law, especially in the areas of human 
rights and criminal law, have placed substantial pressure on tradi­
tional notions of sovereignty, including notions of sovereign immu­
nity. Concepts such as universal jurisdiction have increased the 
potential enforceability of international law in domestic legal sys­
tems. As a result, domestic courts will increasingly face criminal 
and civil cases concerning alleged violations of international law. 
The United States already has experienced this phenomenon, with 
its growing number of civil lawsuits challenging abusive practices 
around the world. 
Tb.is increased relevance of international law to domestic litiga­
tion has the potential to enhance the rule of law in the international 
community. It also means, however, that the enforcement of inter­
national law will increasingly implicate - and sometimes be in ten­
sion with - domestic constitutional standards. We have argued 
that, in the United States, the vagueness of international human 
bus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, 34 WEEKLY 
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2108 (Oct. 23, 1998). The single court to consider the issue has ruled that 
the President's waiver exceeded his authority under the 1998 amendment. See Alejandre v. 
Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1331-32, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18841 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 1999). 
262. For a particularly thoughtful essay on these issues in light of the House of Lords' 
first Pinochet decision, see Paul W. Kahn, On Pinochet, 24 BOSTON REvmw, Feb./March 
1999, at 18. 
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rights law and the foreign policy implications of human rights litiga­
tion justify restrictions on the incorporation of international human 
rights law into the domestic civil litigation system. In addition, we 
have claimed that, for reasons of separation of powers and federal­
ism, federal courts should not play an independent role in incorpo­
rating international human rights law into the U.S. legal system but 
should instead await authorization and direction from the federal 
political branches. The Pinochet decision reduces some of the bar­
riers to the enforcement of international human rights law, at least 
in criminal prosecutions of former heads of state. The decision also 
provides support, however, for the limited and politically controlled 
approach to civil human rights litigation that we have suggested. 
